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CONFIDENTIAL 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

THE 

BERLIN CONGRESS 

By 

HENRY F. MUNRO 



This study is confined to the technique, procedure, and 
general conduct of the BerHn Congress. It presupposes 
knowledge of the questions discussed and of the settle- 
ments arrived at in the Treaty of Berlin 



COMPLETED OCTOBER 14, 1918 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 



CONFIDENTIAL 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 



THE 

BERLIN CONGRESS 



/ •'.( S '? 



By 
HENRY F. MUNRO 



This study is confined to the technique, procedure, and 
general conduct of the BerHn Congress. It presupposes 
knowledge of the questions discussed and of the settle- 
ments arrived at in the Treaty of Berlin 



COMPLETED OCTOBER 14, 1918 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 



u 



3f'. 

.3 



B? •« ». 

MAR 3 1920 



CONTENTS. 



Contents 3 

Preliminary agreements 5 

Initiation of the Congress 6 

Representation and personnel .• 7 

Bismarck chosen president 9 

Rules of precedence, etc 9 

Preliminary organization 10 

Protocols 11 

Petitions 12 

General procedure - 12 

Procedure on a given question 14 

Al^ting 15 

Working organization. Committees 17 

1. Plenary sessions 17 

2. Private discussions and agreements 18 

3. Mediation of "neutral" powers 20 

4. The Boundary Committee (Commission de Delimitation des Frontieres) . 22 

5. Military Commissions 24 

6. The Drafting Committee (Commission de Redaction) 24 

Agencies used or devised 26 

1. European Commissions , 26 

2. Consular Commission 26 

3. Ambassadorial Conference at Constantinople 26 

4. The Danube Commission 27 

5. Financial Commission 27 

6. Mediation of the powers 27 

Information and technical apparatus 27 

Principles applied 30 

General conduct of business 33 

The question of guarantees 36 

Signature, ratification, and communication of treaty 38 

Appendix 1 41 

Appendix II 43 

Appendix III 45 

Appendix IV 47 

Appendix V 49 

Appendix VI 51 

3 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS, 1818. 



B}'- comparison with the Congresses of Westphaha, ^^^^{^™ ^"1.^^^°^° 
Utrecht and Vienna, the Berhn Congress of 1878 was ^o'^s^^^^^s. 
single in purpose and Umited in scope. The earUer 
assemblies in each case marked the close of long, deso- 
lating wars, during which Europe had been ranged into 
two camps. Most European states, great and small, had 
representation and a complexit}?^ of questions, territorial, 
economic, and political, found more or less permanent 
solution. 

The Congress of Berlin was quite otherwise. Its pur- its ostensible 
view was confined to the Eastern Question, so caller), as'^""^""'^' 
it had been recently revived by the Balkan troubles and 
the Russo-Turkish War. Its announced purpose was 
the revision of the treaty of San Stefaho of March 3, 1878, 
in the interest of the public law of Europe, especially 
as set forth in the treaty of Paris of 1856.^ Its real^^i'^^ ■''^^^i p"'^- 
purpose was to impose upon victorious Russi.-i, on the 
demand of Great Britain and Austria, the mandate of 
the Powers that she retrench her conquests and spare 
the Ottoman Empire the cowp de grace. Germany, in the 
person of Bismarck, was the ''broker" and received her 
commission in the definitive adoption by Austria of a 
policy of expansion in the Balkans and the consequent 
abandonment by her of any lingering desire to challenge 
the decisions of Sadowa and Sedan.- The Dual ^Vlliance 
of 1 879 was the visible sign tliat Germany had hor reward, 

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS. 

Not only was the field of discussion limited but the,Jgg,y^f^J;'^|j°° 
discussion itself was in large part perfunctory.^ The 

1 "The stipulations of this treaty are in several points of a nature to modify the state 
of things as fixed by former European conventions, and it is for the piu-pose of submitting 
the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the Cabinets signatories of the treatie, 
of 1S56 and 1S71 that we have assembled. Our object is to secm-e by common agreements 
and on the basis of new guarantees, that peace of which Eui'ope so much stands in 
need"— Speech of Bismarck at~opening session of the Congress, Jiuie 13, 187S. (Parlia- 
mentary Papers, 1S78 [C. 2081], Correspondence respectuig the Congress at Berlin, p. 12.) 

- Moiiy, Souvenirs d'un diplomate in Revue des deux Mondes, Oct. 15, 1904, p. 726. 

5 A further restriction on the scope of the Congress was placed by France, for, in accept- 
ing the iii\itation to participate, M. Waddington stipulated that there should be no 
discussion of Egypt, Lebanon, or the Holy Places. See Moiiy, loc, cit., p. 729; Avril 
Xegoeiations relatives au traite de Berlin, p. 280: Hanotaux, Contemporary France, 
IV, pp. 342-344. 

5 



b THE BEELIX CONGRESS. 

decrees of the high assembly had been formulated in 
advance and the machinery of the Congress served but 
to register them.^ A series of agreements })etween the 
interested powers, made in contemplation of the Russo- 
Turkish War or of the Congress, indicated the lines of 
settlement and left merely the details for the considera- 
agreement!' tion of the ])leiiipotentiaries at Bcu'liii. The chief pre- 
liminary agreements were the following: 

1. The Reichstadt Agreement. July 8. 1878, between Russia and 

Austria, supplemented by further agreements between the same powers, 

Anglo ;liussian in January and April, 1877. These agreements formed the basis for 

the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, in turn. 

stipulated for Bessarabia. - 

2. The secret agreement between Great Britain and Russia, May 30. 
^.Cyprus convcn- 187J,; q^j^^g j^^^j^ ^j-^g Congress possible and virtually dictated the 
terms of settlement. All the points of the treaty of San Stefano were 
Anglo-Austrian to be discussed.^ 
agreement. 3. The Cyprus Convention. June 4. 1878, between Great Britain 

and Turkey. Russia, and probably Germany, were informed of this 
convention before the congress met.'' 
Preliminary '^' ^^^^ secret agreement between Great Britain and xVustria, Juno 
understandings. C, 1878. (Sosnosky, op. cit., I, p. 170, citing Fournier, Wie Wir zu 
Bosnia Kamen, p. 63.) As a result of this. Qreat Britain supported 
Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.^ 

5. Pourparlers between Great Britain, Germany, and Austria re- 
sulting in a genei'al imderstanding as to the ])olicy to be pursuf»l at 
the congress." 

IXITIATIOX OF THE CONGRESS. 

The months preceding the Congress were filled with 
political pronouncement and diplomatic exchange of 
which it is no part of this study to give even a resume. '^ 

1 Larmerou.x, L'Autriclie-Hoiigrie au Coiigres de Berlin, p. S6; Avril, op. cit., p. 260. 

- Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolilik Ooslcrroich-rnganis, I, pp. l.')I-1.52, 160-lGl: Larnie- 
roux, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 00; Coolidge. Origins of tiie Triple Alliance, pp. %, 113-n4; 
Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, p, 361 (note). 

3 Staatsarchiv, vol. 34. No. 6749. Avril, op. cit., pp. 345-346. Hohenlohe. Memoirs 
(Eng. tr.), p. 206; Rose, Development of European Nations, I, p. 278; Argyll, Duke of 
The Eastern Question, II, pp. 136, 144. 

■t Cf. Miiller, Politi.sche Geschichte der Gegemvart, XII, p. 109. Caralheodnry Pasha, 
however, one of (he Turkish plenipotentiaries at the Congre.ss, who liimself was unaware 
of the convention until July 4, was of opinion that it was Austria and Germany that 
knew of i( in advance. See Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, p. 375 (note). For the text of the 
Cyprus Convention, see Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, I^^ pp. 2722-2725. 

■' "You will not forget the ancient alUance between Austria and this cotmtry, and 
the general coincidence of their interests. It is important that in the cUscussions of the 
congress on these matters you should support any legitimate projiosals tending to 
benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. * * *" Lord Salisbury 
to Lord Odo Russell, .lune 8, 1878 (Hritish and Foreign State Papers. LXIX, p. 833). 

'^ Moiiy, op. cit., p. 726. 

' For the diplomatic exchanges, see British and Foreign State Papers, LXIX, pp. 
794-830. Cf. also Bismarck's Speech in the Reichstag, February 19, 1878, in Hahn, 
Fiirst Bismarck, vol. 3, pp. 80-98. See also Hansard, ParUamentary Debates, 3d ser., 
vols. 237-240, passim.; Miiller, Politische Ge.schichte der Gegenwart, XII, pp. 78-79 
(Andrassy's speech). 



TI-IE BEELIN CONGRESS. 7 

Suffice it to state that it was Austria which first proposed 

collective action in the suggestion, on February 5, 1878, 

that the Eastern Question be submitted to a conference ^.,4 prgjosed^^^ 

of the powers signatory to the treaty of Paris of 1856 

and the London Protocol of 1871. Vienna (later Baden) 

was indicated as the place of meeting. However, after 

the treaty of San wStefano had been signed, Austria, on 

March 7, substituted a proposal for a congress at Berlin 

to be attended by the Prime Ministers of the Great 

Powers.^ This met with acceptance, especially after the 

i\jiglo -Russian agreement of May 30, and on June S 

formal invitations to the Congress were issued by the 

German Government, the powers consentmg, so the invi- ^^p'-^^^^^^^Jf"®^ 

tation ran, "to admit the free discussion of the whole 

contents of the treaty of wSan Stefano." (Hertslet, op. 

cit., IV, p. 2721.) 

REPRESENTATION AND PERSONNEL. 

The congress held its sessions, twenty in all, at the ^^^areand time 
Chancellor's palace in Berlm from June 13 to July 13, 
1878. Accredited plenipotentiaries were present from 
the six Great Powers and from Turkey, being the signa- .piited!" ''''''*'" 
tory powers of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856. 
Representatives from other interested States were ad- 
mitted on occasion for the purpose of laving their specific ^^[ssfon'oTlther 
claims before the Congress, but took no' part in its delib- ''^p^^^'""*^*'^'''- 
erations. For mstance, at the ninth session (June 29) 
the Greek Foreign Minister and the Greek Minister at ^''^'''"'' 
Berlin presented the views of their Government m mat- 
ters affecting Greek interests and retired immediately 
thereafter, being informed that ''the Congress, when it 
shall have studied the consiilerations presented by the 
Hellenic representatives, will communicate to them the 
result of their deliberations." (Parliamentary Papers, 
1878 [C. 2083], Correspondence relating to the Congress 
of Berlin, p. 135). So also with the Roumanian repre-pg^^^^d.'"''* 
sentatives at the tenth, and the Persian Minister at the 



1 " From the point of view of International Law there is no essential difference be- 
tween congresses and conferences * * *. Congresses have usually been convoked 
for the negotiation of a peace between belligerent powers and the redistribution of terri- 
tory which in most cases is one of the conditions of peace. At a congress, as a rule, 
more than two powers have been represented * * *. In the nineteenth century _ 
congresses, properly so called, were held mostly at the capital of one of the powers 
concerned and then the Chancellor or Minister for Foreign Affairs presided. It will be 
found that on these occasions, besides the specially deputed plenipotentiaries, the local 
diplomatic representatives of the respective powers were also appointed." (Satow, 
Diplomatic Practice, II, pp. 1-2.) 



« THE BEELIlSr CONGRESS. 

Montenegro ^cx"^- fifteenth, sessioii. (n)id., pp. 151, 224.) Sorhia, on the 
eluded. other hand, and Montenegro did not have even this lim- 

ited measure of representation. 

Twenty representatives in all participated, threes from 
eaoh of the powers invited, save Italy, whicli sent only 
two. The leading powers designated as first i)lenipoten- 
tiaries their most prominent statemen — Bismarck, Dis- 
raeli, Gortchakoff, Andrassy.^ Included in the list were 
the foreign ministers of most of the Governments parti- 
cipating, as well as all their respective ambassadors 
accredited to the court of Berlin.- Each mission was 
se CIO tar its surrounded with a personnel of secretaries, diplomats, 

and technical per- i-ic • • i-i- i- 

sonnei. technical lunctionaries, experts, and mditary advisers. 

On the. Austrian staff, for example, in adcUtion to the 
three plenipotentiaries, were Baron Schwegel, chief of 
the commercial and consular section in the Ministry of 



1 ''Who would be the men to represent the powers at this congress? As a rule it was 
the business of the diplomatic circles. But this time Bismarck was presiding, the 
ministers would therefore wish to figure in it. Lord Beaconsfield sought therein the 
apotheosis ol his brilliant career. * * * it was not without lively criticism that his 
resolve to attend the congress was made known, even from the ranks of Conservatives — 

" ' From the constitutional point of view, it is rather despotic; from the standpoint of 
tradition, it is without precedent. * * * Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords 
took a lofty tone about it, aimoimcing that he assumed the whole responsibility of this 
step which was taken at the request of his colleagues.' (Memorial r)iploniatique,ls78, 
p. 37S)." Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, p. 339. 

The appointment of (iortchakoff was due to his own personal insistence.* ScliouvalolT, 
whom Gortchakoir supplanted as First Plenipotentiary, has this to say of it : 

" This is a ftuthcr proof of how much is sacrificed with us to personal considerations. 
The Emperor knew that Prince Gortchakolf had no personal weight; he knew the 
strong feeling that Prince Bismarck harboured against the Russian Chancellor; his 
presence in Berlin could only be harmful to our cause. All this was quite palpable, 
and yet, in spite of evcrythmg, Prmcc Oortchakofl" was authorized to come to Berlin."' 
Cited in Hanotaux, op. cit., TV, p. 340. 

Hohenlohe was of opinion that Bismarck chose him, "in order to be able to say to the 
King of Bavaria that, out of consideration for his Majesty, they had taken his ilajesty's 
Kronoberstkiimmerer (Lord High Chamberlain)." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, 11, p. 207. 

- The complete li-^t of the plenipotentiaries is as follows: 

■'For (Germany, Prince Bismarck, Chancellor; Herr vou'liiilow, .Secretary of State 
in the Department of Foreign Allairs; Prince llohciilolu'-Seliillingriirst, .\mbasnidor 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris. 

"For Austria, Comit Andrassy, Minister of the Imperii^ Household and of F'orcign 
Affairs; Count Karoiyi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoteiitiary at Berlin; 
Baron Haymerle, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Home. 

" For France, .M.Waddingtou, Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign .Vlfairs: 
Count de Saint-\'allier, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin; 
Mons. Desprcz, Tirector of Political Allairs at the French Foreign Ollice. 

"For Great Britain, Lord Beaconsfield, Prime Minister; Marquis of Salisl)ury, Secre- 
tary of State for P'oreign Aflairs: Lord ()do Russell, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary at Berlin. 

"For Italy, Count Corti, Minister for Foreign AITairs; Count de Launay, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin. 

"For Russia, Prince GortchakofT, Chancellor; Count Peter Schouvaloll', Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in London; Motis. d'Oubril, Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin. 

" For Turkey, Caratheodory Pasha, Minister of Public Works; Mchemed AH, General; 
Sadoullah Bey, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin." (Satow 
Dililomatic Practice, If, pp. 90-91.) 



Precedent 
congresses. 



THE BERLIlSr CONGRESS. 

Foreign Affairs, Consoiller de Legation Kosiek, First, 
Interpreter of the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople, 
Minister Plenipotentiary von Teschenberg, ConseiUer de 
Legation Baron Hiibner, Hofrath Doczy, Private Secre- 
tary von Piehy, and several others. (The Times, June 5, 
1S7S.) The British mission included some 40 officials of 
the foreign oflice, besides military and oth(>r advisers 
appointed ad hoc} 

BISMARCK CHOSEN PRESIDENT. 

The choice of Berlin as the place of meeting implied, 
ipso facto, that Bismarck would preside over its delibera- 
tions, and this (lu'ite apart from political considerations. 
At Vienna (1815), Paris (1856), and London (1871), it 
had been established that the presidency of such high 
assembly should vest in the representative of the sov- 
ereign whose hospitality it enjoyed. Accordingly, at 
the opening session on June 13, after Bismarck had pro- 
posed that the Congress proceed to elect its ofhcials, 
Andrassy, having previously consulted with the other i^,^t^s^''fi^Jn'a\7il; 
])lenipotentiaries, nominated the German Chancellor as 
president. There was unanimous agreement in his elec- 
tion to the august office.^ 

RULES OF PRECEDENCE, ETC. 

Li details of diplomatic etiquette, the Berlin Congress 
was free from those humorously petty, but mock-impor- 
tant, incidents that characterized the proceedings of 
congresses in the seventeenth and the eighteenth cen- 
turies. Seating arrangements were in accordance with^^^fs"'"'"^'"^'""''' 
the rules of diplomatic practice, as were also all matters 

' For a list of the personnel deputed to taVc part in the worlc of the Congress, see The 
Times, June 13 and 14, 1878 (infra. Appendix I). See also Moiij^ in Revue des deux 
Mondes, Oct. 15, 1904, pp. 739-740. 

.Vs at all Congresses, numerous persons were prescnl, olTlcially and otherwise, to urge 
various claims. De Blowitz, the famous correspondent, writes thus of them: 

"The Congress * * * has also favoured us with an influx of profes.-;ional genllcmen 
ready to assist m the labours of the meeting. Of these, some have been onicially called 
in to give guidance, others are deputed to advise or petition: others still are watching 
the proceedings in the interest of commerce, religion, or race. Civil and military agents 
of all European Powers have flocked hither from all parts of the East. Greek, Servian, 
Roumanian, Armenian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Jewish claimants, like so 
many minor planets, busily revolve round the greater lights of the diplomatic and con 
sular service." The Times, June 20 , 1S7S. 

- For the precedents governing the choice, see the statement of Lord Derby in the 
debate in the Hoase of Lords, March 11, 1S7S. (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d 
ser.. vol. 238, pp. 1036-10411. Infra. Appendix II. 



10 THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 

Lmnia"^' ^^ precedence in signatures and otherwise.' French was 
the hmguage of the Congress, ahhough Bismarck pro- 
fessed some diffidence in its use.^ According to Hohenlohe, 

Uniform. uniform was worn at the opening session in conformity 

with Lord Beaconsfiekl's wish. 

PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION' . 

The Secretariat. Bisiiiarclv, anticipating the functions of his office, was 
ready with an organized secretariat, at the head of which 
The Secretariat was M. de Radowitz, German Minister 
to Greece. His chief colleague was M. le Comte de Moiiy, 
First Secretary of the French Embassy at Berlin ; and 
to assist them Bismarck had (k^signated four functionaries 
of the German Foreign Ofhce — M. Busch, Baron Holstein. 
Count Herbert Bismarck and M. Biicher, the latter 
the "secretarial archivist." The work of the secretar- 

its duties. iat and its division of labor have been thus described b\' 
(h^ Moiiy: 

' ' The editorship of the protocols was put in my charge 
* * * Unquestionably I had to come to an agreement 
with M. de Radowitz for th(^ exact reproduction of the 
debates, but without my being subordinate to him; and 
each protocol, edited entirely by myself, was submitted 
only to the authority of the Congress. 1 must add that 
my colleague and I were always in perfect accord. He 
prepared the orders of the day, watched over the division 
of the work, elaborated the notes necessary to clarify the 
(hscussions, reread the projected protocols with me, and 
above all, under the direction of the president, was in 
constant, Jind often confidential communication with the 
plenipotentiaries. My task, far less complex, did not, 
liowever, cease being troublesome, since I had to con- 
centrate the discussions, which were often long and con- 
fused, into brief and clear form, without weakening or 
exaggerating the thoughts of the orators, })ut it was a 

' For the rules of precedence, see Satow, Diplomatic Practice, I, pp. 3.51-3,53: II, pp. 
1.S2-183. 

"la what was formerly the great hall room a green I able, .-shaped like a horseslioe, had 
lieen placed. In the middle the president's seat; on either side France, left: Austria, 
right: then England next to Austria, Italy to France: further down -Russia on (he 
right. Turlvey on the left. Opposite Bismarck sits Radowitz as recorder; I [Hohcnlohel 
on the left. Biilow on the right." Hohenlohe, op. cit . II. p. 2(17. 

-' "The Imperial Chancellor accompanied me into another room, and spoke again of 
the difficulty which was caused him by presiding in French. He had, however, done 
extremely well, and no one had noticed the embarrassment which he jirofesscd to have 
felt." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 210. 

Wliile the use of French was official, otlier languages were employed Ijy (he plenl- 
jwtentiaries. For example, at the opening session Lord Beaconsfii'lii '-made a long 
speech in Kngli.sh, very clear and emphatic." Ibid.. II. p. 2()n. 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 



11 



Full powers. 



very definite task, and I did not have to concern myself 
in any way with the business reserved to the chief of the 
secretariat and to the assistants designated to him by the 
Chancellor." (Revue des deux Mondes, Oct. 15, 1904, 
pp. 735-736.) 

In addition to its routine duties, the secretariat was 
commissioned by the president to collect and submit for 
examination the documents and full powers from which 
the plenipotentiaries derived their competence. These 
were presented the first day (with the exception of those 
of the Turkish representatives, two of whom had not yet 
arrived), and found to be in good and due form. The 
Ottoman plenipotentiaries presented their fidl powers at 
the next session. 

PROTOCOLS.^ 



At the first session Bismarck made the suggestion, 
which met with the approval of the members, that "all 
propositions and documents destined to appear in the 
protocol should be drawn up in writing and read by those 
members of the congress who initiate them."- When 
drawn up, the protocols were promptly printed aii^l rerdf ^^'^"'^ ^°^ 
distributed among the plenipotentiaries and, in con- 
formity with the suggestion of Bismarck, this distribu- 
tion was substituted for the customary reading, at each 
session, of the protocol recording the minutes of the 
previous session, except that of the first day's proceed- 
ings, which was duly read. If no change was suggested 
by anyone, the text was considered as approved. It 
was understood, of course, that any member could 
request the reading of the entire protocol.^ 

' " During a congress or a conlerencc, no matter for wiiat object or purpose, the minutes 
of meetings of the plenipotentiaries are styled either protocol or proccs-verbal indiffer- 
ently. Perhaps the former word is the more dignified." Satow, Diplomatic Practice 
n, p. 236. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, 1S7S, (3.S) Correspondence relating to the Congress of Berlin 
with the Protocois of the Congress, Turkey, No. 39 (1878) [C. 2083], p. 12 (Hereafter cited 
as Protocols). For the protocols, see also British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. I>XIX, 
pp. 862-1078. 

3 Hanotaux quotes the Turkish First Plenipotentiary as follows: 

"The official protocols give a faitliful report of the work of the congress, and an oflicial 
summary of it, but beneath the diplomatic envelope which uniformly covers all the parts, 
it is hard to find the true aspect of the details. Further, also, the protocols were not 
reread during the meetings and very important modifications were permitted to be 
introduced into them." (Unpublished Memoirs of Caratheodory Pasha.) Contem- 
porary France, IV, p. 346 (note). 



12 THE BEKLTX CONGEESS. 



PETITIONS. 



Various petitions and documents ''of very dis- 
i:)roportionate importance" were addressed to the Con- 
gress or the President. Bismarck instructed the secre- 

mado°^''' "'''^ tariat to make a selection of such as were of political 
interest, summarize them and distribute the lists to the 
members of the Congress. In principle, no proposals or 
<locuments were submitted to the Congress unless intro- 
duced by one of the plenipotentiaries and by this rule 

titSns"^™""^ I'^'the reception of petitions was governed. Anonymous 
petitions were not included in the lists in any case but 
wore placed on file at the secretary's office.^ 

GENERAL PROCEDURE. 

In the course of the early exchanges over the proposed 
cominittec"""'''^^*^^^^'!'®^^^^^' Germany had suggested ''a preliminary con- 
ference of second plenipotentiaries or, better still, of 
their representatives accredited here [Berlin] in order to 
make preparation in regard to matter and form for the 
deliberations of the Conference."'- Such does not appear 
to have been instituted in anticipation of the Berlin 
Congress. According to the Vienna correspondent of 
The Times, however, the German Government had pre- 
pared for the consideration of the plenipotentiaries a 
conSLofParil''^^™^ ^^ proccdurc based on the rules followed at the 
Congress of Paris in 1856.^ But Bismarck made no 
reference to the Paris rules in his remarks on procedure 
at the opening session, nor do the protocols furnish any 
information on the point. In his observations on assum- 
mi^T'in^ orln-^^^^ ^^^^ ofRco of president, he proposed that the ques- 
of importance. ^JQj^g arising out of the treaty of San Stefano should be 
classified and discussed in the order of their importance. 
On this view of it, Bulgaria, its delimitation and future 
Exchange of Organization, called for first consideration and the 
^^^^''' secretariat was instructed to prepare the orders of the 

day accordingly. Further, Bismarck thought it advis- 



1 I'lotocols, pp. 22, 34. 

2 Memorandum from licrlin, .March 1.'., 1S7.S. lirilish and Foreipi State Papers, 
vol. LXIX, p. S02. 

3 "A project to this effoet [for regulating the proceedings] based on the rules observed 
at the Paris Conference of 1856, has been prepared by the German (iovernmcnt and com- 
municated to the plenipotentiaries, so as to give them time and opportunity to study 
it and consult about any amendments deemed desirable before the subject comes on 
in to-morrow's sitting. It is thought probable, too, that the project w ill be accepted, 
such as it is, with the addition of some provisions concerning the foiinal sanction of 
resolutions to be passed." The 'rimes, .Tune 12, 1S7S. 



THE BERLIISr CONGRESS. 13 

able to have an interval of some daj^s before the second 
session "in order to give time to the plenipotentiaries to 
exchange their ideas." Finally, he did not doubt that the secrecy. 
plenipotentiaries would ' ' be unanimous as to the necessity 
of preserving the secrecy of their deliberations." ' 

The order of the day was under the general supervision ^iJ^.''^" °^ ^'^® 
of the president, who, usually with the assent, and 
occasionally with the suggestions, of the members, 
directed the secretariat in the formulation of the subjects 
for discussion.- Sometimes the Congress collaborated 
more directly, as at the session of July 2, when, on the . 
exhaustion of the order of the day, it proceeded, on the 
proposition of Count de Saint Vallier, to make arrange- 
ments for the next session. ^ To expedite business, it 
was agreed at the opening sitting that members intending 
to make new proposals should give notice of such inten- 
tion at a previous meeting, so that all could be prepared 
for the discussion, "proposals connected with questions 
on the order of the day and resulting from the discussion 
• itself to be excepted." Lord Salisbury understood this 
to apply " only to substantive proposals and not to amend- 
ments or secondary questions."^ 

At the fifth session (June 24) it was emphasized by or E^urope'ln'''"'' 
Bismarck, with the approval of the plenipotentiaries, 
that only the questions of general European interest 
should engage the attention of the Congress, in contra- 

' Protocols, pp. 12-13. 

It is unnecessary to add that Europe was kept luUy and accurately informed of each 
day's proceedings through The Times and other journals. De Blowitz, the famous 
correspondent of The Times, was intimate with some of the plenipotentiaries, notably 
with Hohenlohe, and was even employed, unofficially, by Bismarck as a mediator in 
the Anglo-Russian difTerences. 

"July 2. Home at 5 o'clock. Then at 6 I fetched Blowitz to drive with him to 
dinner with the Imperial Chancellor. Blowitz was delighted. The Chancellor worked 
on him in the interests of the Russian claim to Batoum." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, 
p. 219. 

2 The lack of fixed plan made all arrangements at the Congress more or less unstable. 
This is illustrated by Hohenlohe's account of how a prospectus of points remaining for 
discussion, which he was having specially prepared at Bismarck's request, was super- 
seded by an outline of Andrassy's that came to the eye of the chancellor. 

"This is what happened," says Hohenlohe. "This morning I went to Biilow, who 
talked once more with me on the subject and said he had commissioned Jasmund to 
make the resume. I then proceeded to see Jasmund, who was ready to work out a com- 
plete memorandum * * *. I then wentto Waddington, told him of the affair, and 
met with his complete approval. At 1.30 to the congress hall. Schuwaloff laid hold of 
me and said he already knew of the matter and agreed with it * * *. Then Andrassy 
came up, who also knew of it. lie had already drawn up a plan, and wrote it down for 
me * * *. The Imperial Chancellor soon came up, and I showed him this sketch, 
He looked it through and approved it. We then went on to the sitting. Before the 
conclusion the Chancellor asked for my note, which I handed him. He then proposed 
that tltg^iscussion should follow in order, on the basis of this note. Everyone agreed 
and Jasmund's work is superfluous." Memoirs, II, p. 210. 

3 Protocols, p. 172. 

4 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 



con- 
cern discussed . 



14 THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 

distinction to those afl'ecting only Russia and Turkey. 
resen-^d^'for^pH-Q^i^stions not of an urgent nature were reserved for 
vate interviews. " ppiy^te interviews between the powers which take spe- 
cial interest in them." Thus the new treat)^ which should 
embody the work of tlie Congress was to concern itself 
merely with the disputed sti))ulations of the Treaty of 
San Stefano.^ 

PROCEDURE ON A GIVEN QUESTION, 

The actual method of considering specific questions 
was indicated in the course of the second session. The 
Britisli proposal with respect to Bulgaria having been 
presented by Lord Salisbury, and it appearing that more 
detailed information was desirable, it was suggested by 
Bismarck that (hscussion on the question be adjourned 
and that meanwhile the interested cabinets try to reach 
agreement upon as many points as possible. After the 
Interchange of fcsults of this interchange of ideas had been submitted to 

luGclS. 

the Congress, "it would then be the task of the Congress, 
should the agreement not l)e fully established, to endeavor* 
to complete it by means of the intervention of the 
friendly powers." - Count Andrassy liaving expressed 
himself as "ready to take part according to parliamentary 
rules in a general discussion, to be followed by a special 
discussion," Bismarck agreed, adding that it would be 
First and sec- advisable to liavc a first and a second reading in each 

ond readings. _ ^ 

case: "The first should take the place of the general dis- 
cussion, the second would give opportunity for entering 
into details." ^ He considered that "private and 
inrs'^^Ietwcen the"^^^^^-'^^^ meetings between the representatives of the 
toteuic*d^h1i.s^^ P*^"^^^"*^ directly interested" — meetings which he recom- 
mended without assuming the right to convoke them — • 
"would possess the great advantage of better preparing 
the ground for an understanding on questions of detail 
deter^minef'^prm- '^^^fl Wording. The chicf poiut for the full meetings of 
cipies. j-j^g Congress would be to establish an agreement on 

questions of principle; when these questions shall have 
been settled, the method of proceeding will be on the 
Second reading sccoiid reading to draw up a text destined to replace the 

establishes the " o A c^ e ,, 

text. articles ot the Ireaty ot San Stetano. * 

1 Protocols, p. 66. 

- Protocols, p. 2.5. 

3 Ibid. " In conformity with this mode of proceeding, proposed by the president, the 
plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Russia agree to interchange 
their views in private meetings with the object of determining the points of agreement 
and consequently of facilitating the work of the Congress. They will communicate the 
result of these interviews to their colleagues." Ibid. 



THE BEELIN CONGKESS. 15 

At the next session (June 25) Bismarck found it neces- 
sary to admonish the Congress on its tendency to con- 
sider questions beyond its scope. "His Serene Highness, 
recurring to a view which he has already had occasion 
to express, does not think it expedient to discuss second- 
ary questions in the Congress. He regards, for example, 
that on which they are at present engaged as coming 
within this category, and he thinks that in raising this 
fjuestion of the assembly of no tables, of a Russian commis- 
sion, and of a European commission, the Congress exceeds 
the limits assigned for its deliberations; he can not see 
that this discussion of details is a matter of European 
interest. * * * Prince Bismarck adds that he would be 
disposed to put aside the question of Bulgaria so soon as 
a thorough understanding shall have been arrived at on 
the essential ju'iuciples, and then to take into consider- 
ation immediately the other most impotant points of the 
treatyof San Stefano. * * * He intends to propose at 
the next meeting that secondary questions shall merely be 
lightly touched on, and that only objects of a veritable 
European interest shall be discussed at length.' The 
president has, however, no desire to prejudice the 
opinions of his colleagues, and the opinion which he has 
just expressed is an entirely personal one." (Protocols, 
p. 79'.) 

In spite of these arrangements, however, the discus- 
sion of the Bulgarian question concerned itself with an^ 
excess of details. According!}", on its conclusion, Bis- 
marck again reminded the plenipotentiaries that the 
Congress could ''only lay down the bases and leave the pj,^j^g''j^''^',';^y ^^,^J{j" 
details to be elaborated by an assembly to be convoked ^^J^gf'"'^' princi- 
later on, and which would terminate the examination of 
secondary questions."- 

VOTING. 

In' the course of his remarks at the first «ossion ,j^o;^'-\a^/'JJ?fj: 
Bismarck considered it "incontestable that the minority'"'^- 
in the Congress shall not be bound to acquiesce in a vote 
of the majority." But he suggested that resolutions 
taken by majority vote on minor points should kave g^'^^^j^l^'j.^' ^°^*; 
validity as decisions of the Congress, provided that no 

1 The proposal recorded in the protocol of the next session (June 26) as coming from 
Bismarck was one constituting a Drafting Committee, "charged with the preparation 
of a draft of all the stipulations to be inserted in the new treaty, taking into consider- 
ation the resolutions recorded in the protocols of the Congress." (Protocols, p. 89.) 

- Protocols, p. 94. 



16 THE BERLIN CONGRESS. • 

formal ])rotost had been oiitored })y the minority.^ 
Schouvaloff, at a later sitting, invoked the principle 
"according to which the congress is not bound by a 
majority but only by the unanimity of its members."- 
pS^cedur^'n?- ^^ putting the question, parliamentary procedure was 
versed. reversed. For instance, at the third session, when two 

proposals witli reference to the admission of represent- 
^ Motion pat ^t-^,p^ from Grcecc were before it, the Congress voted 
first on the main question — the French proposal — -as 
(vstablishing the general principle, and then on the Brit- 
ish ameiuhuent, the first vote being "considered as con- 
ditional — that is to say, as subject to amendment in con- 
formity with the English ])ro])osition — should the latter 
on*^"equaiity '"o*f be adoptcd.''^ In this case the votes on the amend- 
ment were divided equally, Bismarck voting against it 
as a representative of Germany.^ It was consequent!}^ 
declared lost and the French proposal adopted. 

On occasion, the general principle was approved but 
])rovision made for subsequent amendment as to de- 
tails. For example, at the session of June 22, the Con- 
gress accepted the British proposal concerning Bulgaria 
but reserved the power to introduce into the text of the 
s ifb^s e q^ e n't treaty Certain changes of detail which the parties spe- 
changes m de- dally interested should agree upon in private discussions. 
In this instance, M. Waddington was charged with the 
task of preparing a draft which should reconcile the 
Britisli proposals with the Russian amendments. Schou- 
valoff, while agreeing, subordinated his assent "to the 
right of reverting subsequently to his amendments, for 
if they were rejected, he must in the first instance refer 
to his government."^ On a later occasion (June 25), 
ad^r"*tere°ndum.*^° Schouvaloff requested permission to take a question ad 
open!^°'^°' '®^^ referendum, and, in consequence, the protocol remained 
open until such time as Russia's vote was received." ^ 

' Protocols, p. 14. 

2Ibid., p. 64. 

3 Ibid., p. 3(). 

* Bismarck acted at the Congress in a dual capacity. As president he guided its deliber- 
ations and continually intervened to reconcile divergent points of view. But as first 
plenipotentiary of Germany he presented the German position on various questions 
and often voted ex parte, especially when German diplomatic commitments required 
it. Thus, at the sitting on June 22 he stated that he could not, as German plenipo- 
tentiary, "remain entirely neutral" on the question then before the Congress (ibid., 
p. 49). He argued in support of the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid., 
p. nS) and of the cession of Bessarabia to Russia (p. 138). While opposed as German 
representative to the reception of the Roumanian delegates, "he wished to subordinate 
his vote to that of the powers more particularly interested" and gave his consent 
accordingly (ibid., p. 135). 

•' Ibid., p. 50. 

6 Ibid..pp. 77, 112. 

The Turkish plenipotentiaries repeatedly refen-ed to their government for instruc- 
tions on given questions. Ibid., pp. 171, 183, 211, 231. 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 17 

WOKKiNG ORGANIZATION — COMMITTEES. 

The actual decisions of the congress were taken 
through one or other of the following channels: 

1. Plenary meetings of the Congress. 

2. Preliminary discussions (pourparlers) and private 

agreements among the plenipotentiaries of in- 
terested powers. 

3. Mediation of "neutral" powers. 

4. The Boundary Committee. 

5. Military Commissions. 

6. The Drafting Committee. 

1. PLEXARY SESSIONS. 

In genqral, Bismarck adhered closely to his position, 
early taken, that "the chief point for the fuU meetings 
of the Congress would he to estahlish an agreement on 
questions of principle," leaving details, if commg within „ions" deal wuil 
the. purview of the Congress, to be arranged by other '^,f '''''"' ^''^• 
means. ^ Accordingly, the Congress, under the watchful 
eye of its president, gave its attention to the broad lines 
of settlement, carefully relegating secondary questions quest'^i^ns''^ 
to committees or to private interviews. If necessary, of '^Xfaaulviow by 
course, the Congress in plenary session took final review ^^® congress. 
of all work done by the committees, which implied that 
it had to concern itself to some extent with details.^ 
Thus, at the sitting of July 6, we find the Congi-ess giving 
diligent study (and the need was great) to a map, sub- 
mitted by Schouvaloff, on which were indicated the lines 
of the Russian concessions in Asia. (Protocols, p. 209.) 
But as a rule, minor questions were avoided. Tliis Bitmlrck^s^^ nii- 
ruling of Bismarck, strictly adhered to, enabled him to"'^' 
expedite business and to avoid the danger, always 
latent, of open disagreement, for the discussion could 

i"Tho presiient thinks thit the numerous detiils contemplated bj' the proposal 
just rei-i are baj'jiil the tiskof the Oai^ress. The plenipotentiaries are assembled to 
aucept, reject, or replace the articles of the treaty of San Stefano, butsneh a detailed de- 
velopment of a special point does not appear to him to come under the province of the 
High Assembly." Protocols, pp. 167-168. 

"The President observes that it is not the business of the Congress to discuss these 
questions in fu"l litlin'?, and the Coj^ress de?ides upon referring the propositions of the 
first pl_'ai!)>t'i itiwy of T irkcy to the Drifting Coimiittee." Ibid., p. 155. 

5 P.i-i'.e Hihenlohehavinjiin luired whether the Boundary Committeeshould submit 
jls work to the Congress before transmitting it to the Drafting Committee, Coimt de 
St. Vallier expresses an opniioji, .shared by the High Assembly, that the Congress 
should in the first place, approve the work of the Boundary Committee, which should 
be subsequently referred to the Drafting Committee so far as questions of form are con- 
cerned." Protocols, p. 1,56. 

88264— 18-— 2 



lificuil 



18 THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 

at any time, on the suggestion of tlio president, be ad- 
journed for further consideration. It was this knowl- 
edge that a given question before the Congress either 
had been, or could be. settled behind closed doors, that 
I'roceediii^'s ar- gave its proceedings an artificial, predigested character, 
and afforded to the chief participants opportunity to 
indulge in the ''high-sounding nothings" of full-dress 
oratory,^ 

Sometimes, when positive discussion in plenary ses- 
sion was inexpedient, the Congress would take notice 
of motions, observations, or declarations, which other- 
wise would find no place either in the completed treaty 
or in the protocols.^ It was thus that Salisbury and 
Schouvaloff had read into the record their respective 
declarations of policy with regard to the closing of the 
Turkish straits. (Protocols, pp. 270, 277.) 

2. PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENTS 

The key to the discussions of the Congress is to be 
Private meet- found, as has been indicated, in the private meetings of 

mgs of Austrian, ' . . . •hip* • • /-^ 

British, and R us- the plenipotentiaries, especially those oi Austria, (jrreat 

sian plenipoten- .^. ' -.i n •• -rf 

tiaries. Britain, and Russia.^ At the very first sitting Bismarck 

recommended an intermission of some days for an ex- 

withdrawai of change of ideas, and later in the same session, when the 

forces discussed '^ icit-»-j' 

privately. qucstioii of the Withdrawal of the Russian forces from the 

vicinity of Constantinople threatened an impasse, he 
made the specific suggestion that the question should 
first form the subject of direct discussion between the 

1 See, for example, the speeches of Gortchakolf, Bismai\k, and Bear-oiisfield in Pro- 
tocols, pp. 89-90; 206-209. 

- " M. de Lauiiaj- confiues himself to asking for the insertion of his motion in the pro.- 
tocol." Ibid, p. 2.5o. 

"Count Corti * * * confines himself to requesting that his observations may be 
inserted in the protocol." Ibid, p. 2.56. 

» "The great questions are in reality discussed and solved in the preliminary ccnicr- 
ences, and when they are brought before the Congress formally consti'aitod. the minor 
plenipotentiaries maintain a respective silence. Questions of seccndaiy imf oitsnte, 
on tJie contrary, are not so carefully prepared beforehand, and give Uie minor plenipo- 
tentiaries an opportunity of taking a more activepart in the discussion." -The Times, 
July .I, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence). 

"All Friday and Saturday the coryphees of the Congress devoted themselves t-o pri- 
vate interviews. F/ord Beaconsfield conferred with Coimt Schouvaloff, Prince Bis- 
marck, and Count Andrassy; Count Schouvaloff spent half a night in solitary conclave 
with his Vienna colleague, while Prince Bismarck likewise held spec ial confereme with 
the Russian and Austrian plenipoleirliaries." Ibid., .Time 17, 1S7S (Berlin Correspond- 
ence). 

"Juno 21. Negotiations all day between SchoiivalolT, Bismarck, and Beaconsfield. 
Hope is entertained of some agreement, since the wording of the answer from St. Peters, 
burg was favorable." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, ]i. '2Vi. 



THE :PERLIN CONGRESS. l§ 

Russian and British representatives. (Protocols, p. 14.) ^ 
Even the order in which the questions should be discussed 
seems to have been fixed by private arrangement among 
the plenipotentiaries.- The most difficult questions for 
adjustment came at the beginning and toward the end 
of the Congress — the questions of Bulgaria and Batoum. 
Over both the Congress was nigh a rupture, but the 
pourparlers of the interested plenipotentiaries, aided by 
the good offices of Bismarck, intervened to effect settle- 
ment."' The Batoum question was rendered all the more 

(1) "The Political Correspondence of this evening [June 14] publishes the followng: 
'The confidential pourparlers which have I)een carried on since the day before yesterday 
between the plenipotentiaries in Berlin relates tothequesticnwhichhasonce more been 
mooted, of a simultaneous withdrawal of the British and Russian naval and military 
forces from the neighborhood of Constantinople. This question will be brcught before 
the Congress on Monday it an understanding is effected in the interval.' " The Times, 
June 15, 1878, in telegram from Vienna. 

(2) " The decision to be come to about the mode of proceeding [order of discussion of 
questions] may very likely in a great measure depend on the result of the confidential 
pourparlers going on within the last few days, and in the first instance, of course, on 
those between Coimt Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, and Count Schouvalcll, at first 
separately and later on between all three together * * * But although progress is 
reported, the impression is that things are as yet far from being near a conclusion; and 
this strengthens the belief that some time will be devoted to furtlier private negotia- 
tions before the real business of the Congress begins. The pourparlers no^vv going on be- 
tween the three powers most closely interested are, in fact, but the continuation of 
those previously carried on in Vienna and London." The Times, June 17, 1878 
(Vieima Correspondence). 

"It appears that the confidential pourparlers have already led to an understanding 
about the mode of proceeding with the discussion of the treaty. The plenipotentiaries,^ 
it is said, have decided to avoid anything like a general consideration and enter at once^ 
in medias res * * * Bulgaria, with all connected with it, is to liave priority of atten-. 
tion." Ibid., Jime 18, 1878 (Vienna Correspondence). 

(3) The follo\ring excepts from The Times correspondence will indicate the nature- 
and the methods of the pourparlers on the Bulgarian question: 

"All that can, therefore, be safely assumed, is that the Bulgarian question has formed^ 
the main subject of the recent confidential pourparlers and that it has made some pro- 
gress." Ibid., June 18, 1878 (Vienna Correspondence). 

"Yesterday's informal negotiations producing no result, the Bulgarian discussionv 
in to-day's sitting of the Congress likewise left the situation unsolved. Private inter- 
views will be resumed tomorrow." Ibid., June 20, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence). 

"The plenipotentiaries of England, Russia, and Austria, in a conference held tliis 
evening at 5 o'clock, agreed to the following points, which will be submitted tomorrow 
to the Congress for ratification * * * Thus tomorrow's sitting will furnish tlie most 
deUcate task of the Congress * * * A telegram from Constantinople constrained 
the Russians thus to settle these questions. At the same time this solution is equally 
due to the personal intervention of Prince Bismarck, v/ho spoke with Lord Beaconsfield 
to-day." Ibid., June 22, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence). 

"The Russian plenipotentiaries, in several official sittings, conferences, and inter- 
views, declaring themselves unable to make the requisite concessions. Lord Beacons- 
field at last gave them to understand that if to-day's sitting were allowed to pass without 
producing any result, he would probably deem it incumbent upon him to leave * * * 
In the conference or at the social board, in lobby or at chance meetings in street and 
park, as often as the important subject was broached, Russian insinuating eloquence 
encountered the firm front of English resolve." Ibid., Jime 24, 1878 (Berlin Corres- • 
pondence of June 22). 

"To-day, before the pubUc sitting, there was a long private interview between the 
plempotentiaries of Russia, England, and Austria. In this interview, which was held 
at 11 o clock, the last points which remained in suspense from the sitting of yesterday 
were settled, in order that the arrangements arrived at * * * might be laid before 
the Congress. Doubtless concessions have been made to Russia with which it would 
haye been preferred to dispense." Ibid., June 24, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence). 



20 THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 

delicate because of tlie unauthorized publication of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of May .30, and it needed all 
the diplomatic resources of assembled Europe to prevent 
iiu^oTt'ht.Tego! a break.' The protocols, however, in their official for- 
tiations. malitj, reveal little of the atmosphere in which these 

negotiations were conducted, save that the appeals to 
the plenipotentiaries to discuss matters in private usually 
coincided with the periods of tension.- Occasionally, on 
session^''"''" ^' qucstious of detail, the plenary session was suspended to 
permit of agreement by discussion between the repre- 
sentatives of interested powers — for instance, between 
the Austrians and Russians over the navigation of the 
Danube (Protocols, p. 186) and between the Russians 
and the British and Turkish over the demarcation of the 
Asiatic frontier (ibid., pp. 276-277). 

But even after the results of the pourparlers had been 
brought to the Congress, a residuum of discussion often 

tions"o"/thepien-^"^^^^^^^^'^' gi^i^^o ^o the plenary assembly a definite func- 
ary congress. ^jqj^ jj^ f]^^, determination of issues. Details had to be 

settled and minor differences removed. The full Congress, 
too, gave the respective parties an opportunit}- to y})ar 
for more favorable positions than they niay have hap- 
pened to hold in tlie preliminary discussions, or, at the 
worst, to sound their di})lomatic trumpets for the beating 
of a graceful retreat.'' 

3. MEDIATION OP " NEUTRAL" POWERS. 

Tlie powers represented at the Berlin Congress were 

not equally interested in its adjustments. On most 

questions the vital interests of Austria, Great Britain, 

France, Mdmiy^^i^^^ Russia Were directly affected, while Germany, 

hold the balance. France, and Italy held the balance and mediated in the 

(1) Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, pp. 350-351. 

(-) Thus Andrassy on the Batoum question: 

"The first Plenipotentiary of Austria, calling to remembrance precedents wliichhave 
led to good results, believes, with Lord Salisbury, that private interviews between the 
representatives of the two powers more sperially interested might smooth difficulties 
which still oppose thomelves to an imderstanding on which all his hopes are bent. His 
Excellency declared that he accepts beforehand the results of the discussion which 
will be carried on between the two powers." Protocols, p. 208. 

The part played by these informal discussions, though many of them are unrecorded, 
is apparent from a perusal of the official proceedings. See Protocols, pp. 13, 14, 15, 
25-26, 38, 40, 50, 66, 93, 151, 156, 18,), 199, 207, 208, 209, 225, 238, 277. 

» In such a discussion in full Congress each side in turn may expect to be more fa\ or- 
ably situated than in the preliminary conference, * * * as it may chance to carry 
its point by the support of the other powers m-1io * * * took no active part in them 
» * *. But even as regards those points abotit which the preliminary conferences 
have led to some sort of imderstanding, it was hardly to be sujiposod that no effort 
should be at least made in the full silting of the Congress to defend them, and, with 
resp<^ct to Russia especially, some defense on the stipulations of San Stefauo has to be 
made, at least for form's sake. The Times, June 19, 1878 (Vieima correspondence.) 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 21 

dispiitos.' The rolo of the "neutrar' powers was thus 
set forth by Bismarck at the session of June 26: ''The 
states less directly interested in tlie questions which 
might trouble the peace of the world are naturally called 

, . 1 • • -I Their role as 

upon to raise an mipartial voice on every occasion wnen, neutral poweis. 
for motives whicli appear of secondary importance in 
the eyes of Euro})e, tlie pacihc object of the meetings of 
the Congress may be compromised. It is in this sense 
that France, Italy, and Germany would appeal, if neces- 
sary, to the wisdom of those of the friendly powers wliose 
interests are mor(^ ]>nrticularly engtvged." (Protocols, p. 
90.) 

It has been already noticed (supra, p. 19) that M. ^,,.^1^- waddjn?ton 
Waddington was commissioned to draft an sigreement ™*se agreement. 
between the British and the Russian positions, which 
task he accepted only ''as a mission of conciliation." 
He succeeded, and Bismarck thought it right "in the 
name of the High Assembly to thank the French pleni- 
potentiaries for the services which they have, rendered 
to the cause of peace in facilitating an understanding by 
the text which they have just prepared." (Ibid., pp. 
50, 77.) At the session of June 25, in the matter of sub- 
stituting European commissions for Russian commissions 
during the provisional administration of Bulgaria, Count Italian repre- 

o I » 1 /^ o / sentative medi- 

Corti, "at the request of the Congress, consents to exam-ates. 
ine, in concert with tlie representatives of the three 
powers more immediately interested, into the modifica- 
tions to be introduced hito the text of the treaty of San 
Stefano in the sense of Count Andrassy's proposition." ' 
As a result of the Italian mediation, the plenipotentiaries 
of the interested powers agreed upon a new draft. (Ibid., 
pp. 79, 93.) Again, in questions relative to the I^^'^ube ^^e^fljattai^^re 
Commission, with respect to which the Russian and thesion- 
Austrian representatives offered divergent proposals, the 
Congress decided to utilize tlie mediation of a third 
power to brhig the two texts into accord. For that 
pur])ose Baron de Haymerle and M. d'Oubril met the 
Count de Saint Vallier during a suspension of the sitting 
and agreed upon an arrangement satisfactory to both 
parties. (Ibid., pp. 183, 186.) 

iThis, however, is true of Germany o-ily in a quilified sense; for she, too, entered 
the Con<^re3S with a detiiiite, thon'?h eiretiilly concealed policy, however Bismarck 
might asseverate tliat she was "connected by no direct interests with the matters of 
the East." He saw to it that Austria secured a field for expansion and at the same 
time that Great Britain and Russia did not entirely compose their quarrel. 



'i2 THE BERLIN COISTGEESS. 

4. THE BOUNDARY COMMITTEE (COMMIS.SIOX DE DELIMITATION 
PES FRONTIERES). 

Boundary qiies- ^g ^jjp woi'k of the CoiiOTess advancod, it found itself 

tions prominent. ~ 

more and more concerned with questions of boundary, 
and the need of a more expeditious method l>ecame 
apparent. Accordingly, at the the eighth session (June 
28), on the proposal of Baron de Haymejle, it was 
Membership of j,ggQiypj \_q institute a Committee, consisting of one iileni- 

tno committee. . 

potentiary for each power, to be charged ''with formulat- 
ing and submitting to the Congress a tracing of the fron- 
tier," the plenipotentiaries to indicate to the secietariat 
their choice of delegates. (Protocols, p. 121.) At the 
next session (June 29) the personnel of the committee was 
announced and thereafter, until the Congress rose, it was 
busy almost daily with various and often critical controver- 
ts functions, sies over the delimitation (^f the boundaries.' It was its 
function to agree as far as possible on details and then to 
Its relation tog^^ii^niit its work to the Congress for ratification.- It also 

the mihtary com- '^ . . 

mission. directed the work of the Military Commission (see below) 

whose decisions in turn it usually adopted. From the plen- 

its ^york as arv asscmblv its reports went to the Drafting Committee 

signed bv Con- • • t pi txti -i 

gress. to be put luto duc foriu for the text of the treaty. While 

in general, the Congress mdicated with what questions the 

Boundary Committee should deal, in one instance at 

Committee asks lej^gt, (the Bub-ariau frontier) the Committee asked that 

for Bulgarian ^ v ;-< 

question. the question, with all its details, be remitted to it for its 

consideration and (iecision, which request was complied 
with by the Congress. (Protocols, pp. 166, 167.) 

sembk-^thfcon- ^he Boundary Committee, in its deliberations, natur- 
in U.S deiib- j^lly reflected the dilTerences, and employed the methoiis, 
bf the pl6nary Congress.^ It effected compromises, somc- 

> The boundary committee was as follows: For Germany, Prince Hohenlohe; for 
.Vustria, Baroii de Haymerie; for France, Coimt de Saint Vallier; for CJreat Britain, Lord 
Odo Russell; for Italy, Count de Launay; for Russia, Count SchouvalotT; for Turkey, 
Mehemed Ali Pasha. (Protocols, p. 132). Hohenlohe was chairman. 

2 "The preliminary'delilierations which commenced yesterday under the presidency 
of Prince Hohenlohe, and wliich are attended by one representative of each power, will 
continue to lie held. Their ol)ject is to prepare the matters wliich are to come before the 
full sitting of tlie Congress, or to a certainextent to settle, as in committee, difficult points 
which at the full sittings, it would not be easy to dispose of \rithout considerable delay. 
The arrangement is such that when certain matters have been referred to this committee, 
the full Congress will be able to continue its labors .in regard to other questions, and 
subsequently take up those wliich have been submitted to the second plenipotentiaries 
under the presidency of Prince Hohenlohe." The Times, July 1, 1878. 

3 The following excerpts will illustrate its methods and difficulties: 
"July 1. Sitting of the Committee on the Servian frontier question where we came td 

no conclusion, since Mehemet Ali made difficulties. " Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 219.. 

"July 4. The commission for the adjustment of the frontiers began its sittings at 
12 o'clock yesterday. The Bulgarian frontier was first discussed, and the requisite 



sress 
e rrations 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 23 

times with insuffirient data, and was prinoii)ally con- 
cerned with diplomatic settlements, even in defiance of 
racial or o;eographical considerations.^ On occasion, the 
"neutral" members of the committee were res])onsil)le ^oi- ^/^^fl^ence^^^^of 
its decisions, as m the matter of the Asiatic frontier, 
where the line, an intermediate one between the line 
asked for by the British and that offered by the Russians 
''had been alopted by an imanimous vote of the neutral 
powers." (Dispatch "of Salisbury, July 10, 1878, Pro- 
tocols, p. 213).- 

Usually the reports (especially the majority reports) of nil^^Je^considered 
the Boundary Committee became the subjects of f urther ^^ ^°'''^'^''- 
discussion in plenary Congress, and, agreement failing 
there, it once or twice became necessary to empower theggf^YemenTof. 
Committee to settle a question of detaii by majority vote ^f^f^'j;°^yc°™- 
without referring it back to the Congress or to special 
commissioners. In each case, however, when this was 
done by the Committee, its decision received the sanction 
of the fuU assembly. (Protocols, pp. 230, 239, 241, 251.) 
In one instance (re the valley of Alach-Kerd in Asia 
Minor) the Committee confessed that, in the absence of 
accurate knowledge as to the territory, it could not ar- 
rive at a decision, and referred the question to a special q^^^lJj'^r^'i^^^g gp°f 
mihtary commission to settle the dispute after the con-"^^^"™'"*^^'^^- 
gress should rise. (Protocols, p. 269.) 

instructions were pven to I ieut. Col. Bliihme for deliberation in the commission of 
experts. The Enrlish difficulties then were mentioned. * * *" Ibid. 

"July 6. Yesterda}- at 12 o'clock Delimitation Commission. We made no prog- 
ress, as the English plenipotentiar}- was not sufficienth' instructed * * *. After 
the sitting I dissussed the Balkan frontier fiu-ther with Salisbury * * *. I then went 
to dine with Bxilow, and explained to Schouvaloff, who dined there, too, a proposed 
method of adjusting the differences, whicli I had meantime thought out. Schouvaloff 
assented to it, but advised me to defer the proposal until the last moment * * *. At 
9.30 there was a long sitting of the f Commissi on, when we again drew up reports * * *.'" 
Ibid. p. 221. 

"Tily 7. .U thi clo5J of th? dj'vata I * * * as cei the Chauci'llor (o put the Bul- 
garian tr.ontier question on the order of the day for Mondav, since 1 was rchictantly 
eompflled to sav thit theCommissJon could not agree on the subject * * *. I replied 
that * * * the instructions of individual plenipotentiaries were defective. (Jdo 
Russell was naturally angry at this. He said nothing, but after the sitting declared 
hs would ta'ce no further part in the sittings of the Commission. But he allowed him- 
self afterwards to be pacified by Schouvaloff." Ihid., p. 222. 

' "After this sitting |of the Congress] the D-^limitation Commission at once held its 
sit'ing, in o'-der to smooth the differences of opinion between (rortchaVotT and Beacons- 
fie.ld. After a long search we found a small piece which we could take away from the 
Russians: some mountain ridges, oit of waiah we m id2 a so-called ligni dc conciliation. 
Which was then accepted. None of us knew whether it was a se^vsible frontier.'' Hohen- 
lohe, op. cit., II, p. 224. 

2 So, too, over l;he Sandjak of Sofia: 

"Th3 discussion became so warm at one of th-.- last sittings of the commissiou that 
Germany, France, and Italy intervened and submitted a compromise boundary, which 
will jirobabl'/ be adopted by the Commission and Congress." The Times, .Tuly.5, 1S7S 
( BrirliQ Corresnondence). 



24 THE BEELIISr CONGRESS. 

5. MILITARY C()A[Ml.SSIONM. 

As military considerations were of paramount impor- 
tance in the definition of the frontiers, the Boundary Com- 
mittee of necessity had to rely for its technical decisions 
on the military experts attached to the various missions. 
Hence, many of the issues that ilivided the Con2:ress were 
in fact carried over, through the Committee, to its mili- 
tary commissioners, and when those failed to effect settle- 
ment, the Committee would report no progress and the 
controversy have to seek other solution in plenary ses- 
sion.^ Thus the military commissions played an impor- 
tant, sometimes a decisive part, in the final results and 
were responsible, in turn, for many of the differences that 
threatened more than once to render agreement impos- 
sible.- 

ti. THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE (COMMISSION DE REDACTION). 

Draftin' Commit '^^^® proposal for a Drafting Committee was made by 
'ee- Bismarck, in the name of Germany, at the session of 

June 26. Its function was stated to be ''the preparation 
of a draft of all the stipulations to be inserted in the new 
treaty, taking into consideration the resolutions recorded 
in the protocols of the Congress." The proposal was 
adopted, and the Committee was constituted before the 
A French chair- next session (JuuG 28).^ As the language of the treaty 
was to be French, it was natural that the chairman of the 
Committee should be the French representative, Desprez. 

'"Count SchoiivaloS [speaking as a member of the Boundary Committee] recalls 
that the ConTress, in one of its first sittings, admitted unanimously that the Sandjak 
of Sofia sho.ild be incorporated into the Principality of Mulsaria, subject to a strategic 
rectification of its frontiers. When the question was transmitted to the examination 
of the specialists of all the powers, they understood that it was a question of choosing 
between several crests those which could be best applicable to the conditions of defense. 
Such has not Ijeen the oinnion of tht' Kn,'Iish staff odicers: they have as'.ced to put back 
the frontiers beliind the chain of mountains, and have, in this manner, converted a 
strategic rectification into a territorial cession." Protocols, p. 22S. See also The Times, 
.Tuly 5 and 10, 1S7S. 

■>■ " July (i. * * * At 12 o'clock I found Lieutenant Colonel Bliihme in the hall, and 
he told me thai ho had arranged nothing with the English general, and that in their 
special commission they had arrived at no conclusion." Ilohenlohe, op. cit., p. 221. 

"July H). A sitting of the commission on the morning of the dth to make final settle- 
. nienls of the Servian frontier. Wo waited a long time for Lieutenant Colonel Bluhmc, 
who came at last and brought before us the proposed frontier of Servia. We accepted 
it by •') votes to 2, as also the western frontier of Bulgaria." Ibid., p. 224. 

"July 10. * * * Delimitation Commissio!i afterwards. M'e waited for the pror 
pos.il of the military members, who again quarreled about the strategic position in the 
valley of Alach-Kerd * * *. Lieutenant Colonel liliihme arrived at last and m.ade 
his report, whereupon we drew up a resolution." Ibid., p. 225. 

3 The following were the members of the Drafting Committee: I-'or Oormany, Prince 
Hoheulohe; for Austria-Hungary, Baron Ilaymerle; for i'raneo, M. Desprez; for Great 
Britain, Lord Odo Kussell: for Italy, Col'int de Launny. for Russia , M. d'Oubril: for 
Turkey, Carath^odory Pasha. 



THE BERLIN CONGKESS. 25 

WHiile its chief task was to agree upon a draft of 
articles previously debated, it sometimes had to consider, 
in connection with the work of drafting, questions which 
were passed on to it from the plenary Congress. Thus 
certain propositions relative to the Roumanian tribute 
were regarded as outside the business of the Congress and 
were referred to the Drafting Committee for suitable 
action. (Protocols, p. 155.) So also with the stipu- 
lations respecting the navigation of the Boiana. (Ibid., ]). 
157). Bismarck occasionallv shelved proposals- -mostly ^j^f^^^^"^,)^^;^^^ 
Turkish- which he did not wish to entertain, by referring *^i-^ p'-op''^'^'^ 
them to the Drafting Committee, where they were 
usually not revived.' Although its work was more 
technical than deliberative, different points of view were 
sometimes developed in the Committee,- but when 
reported to the Congress they were not entertained, for 
Bismarck rigidly insisted upon "the inconvenience wliit'b ^^^^^[^^"J^^s^ J^^ 
would attend the modification of the resolutions adopted ^n^ertained to 
by the Cjngress and which have formed the basis for the 
labors of the Drafting Committee.'' ^ 

The Committee made its first report on the draft treaty 
at the session of July 9. Its plan followed the order of 
the discussion in the Congress and the reporter, M. 
Desprez, added that the treaties of Paris of March 30, p;^^^ir^ea^ues^^of 
1856, and of London of March 13, 1871, were to be main-^on maintained 
tained "in all of their provisions, which are neither 
modified nor abrogated by the future treaty." The 

> "The presiient states tliat the Ottoman pleuipoteittiaries will be able to support 
these observations later on before the Drafting Committee, to which the report of the 
Boimiary Co3imittee will be referred. * * *." Protocols, p. 18-3. 

2 "Jul/ 4. * * * Then at 2 the Report Commission met. which deliberated on the 
organisation of Eastern Roumelia. Protests were raised by the Turkish ambassador, 
Caratheoiory, against the proposal that the gorornor should be a Christian. But we 
did not go further into the subject. The negotiations were very tedious. We were not 
finished until 5 o'clock * * *." Hqhenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 220. See also Protocols, 
p. 255. 

".luly 12. * * * At 9 o'clock once more Report Commission, which lasted untill2 
o'clo3k. I once more settled a threatening difference of opinion between Russians and 
English as to the frontiers in Asia." Hohenlohe, op. cit., II, p. 225. 

s Bismarck's ruling on this point was directed chiefly against Turkey. With others he 
was not so strict: e. g.— < 

"M. Desprez reals the section on Servia. With respect to the capitalization of the 
tribute of the prinsipalit 7, Prince Gortchakoff points out the importance of this question, 
on wliich the Rissian plenipotentiaries would have objections to bring forward. Prince 
Uohenlohe.the Baron de Hajmierle, and M. d'Oubril having announced, moreover, that 
the,' hav-e re«rvei, in this respect, the votes of their Governments [in the Drafting 
Committee], the congress decides to place this question on the order of the day for the 
next sitting." Protocols, p. 256. 

"The president observes that an unanimous decision would be required in order to 
carry the compulsory redemption of the tribute * * *. His Serene Highness must 
therefore look upon the question as decided, and the Drafting Committee should sup- 
press tho article in its draft relative to tlie capitalisation of Rounianian and Servian 
tributes." Ibid., p. 268. 



26 I'HE BEBLIN CONGBESS. 

objection being raised by Salisbury that such cjuahfi- 
cation was not specific enough, especially with res])ect to 
the Straits, the discussion which followed indicated, in 
the opinion of the president, that the Congress gave its 
assent to the plan of the Drafting Committee and that 
New treaty the ucw treaty was to take precedence of the treaties of 

takes precedence •'■ i p p /-r* 

over the old Pans, of Loudon, and of San Stefauo. (Protocols, p. 242.) 

treaties. . i/>i/-i- 

At the sinisequent sessions the work of the Committee 
was substantially adopted by the Congress withoui. 
material change. 

AGENCIES USED OR DEVISED. 

The object of the Berlin Congress was to formulate A 

treaty. Many of its provisions, however, required other 

Machinery used ine,ans of enforcement than the mere fiat of the high 

treaty. assembly. Some of the necessary instrumentalities were 

ready to hand; others had to be created. The following 

were the chief agencies employed: 

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION.S. 

Bulgarian and Tliesc, two in nuiiiber, were instituted under the treaty 

Rouraeliau Com- »„,. it-itii • j< • / -i \. 

missions. of Benin, one to delimit the Bulgarian frontier (article 2); 

the other to organize Eastern Roumelia in concert with 

Special duties the Ottomaii Portc (article 18). The Roumelian Com- 

of the Roumelian .. . iiiit-» -ij- 

Commission. missiou was also to be consulted by the Forte with ref- 
erence to the reforms promised for the other parts of 
European Turkey not specially organized under the 
treaty (article 23).^- 

2. CONSULAR COMMISSION. 

Consuls dele- Coiisuls of the signatory powers, together with a 

gated ad hoc. _ . . ' o 

Turkish commissioner, were delegated ad hoc to assist 
the Russian commissioner in the provisional administra- 
tion of Bulgaria. Their powers and methods of pro- 
cedure were defined in article 6 of the treaty. 

i. AMBA.SSADORIAL CONFERENCE AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 

tions"assi<med°t°o '^'^^^ di])lomatic representatives of the signatory powers 

the ambassadors, g^^ Constantinople were invested with certain functions 

arising out of the treaty. They constituted the final 

appeal in case of disagreement between the Russian or 

1 The Emopean Conmiission for the delimitation of Bulgaria was also to determine 
the frontier line of the Dobrudja cession to Roumania (article 48). 

For references to European Commissions in the discussions of the Congress, .^e/( 
Protocols, pp. 47, 65, 67, 77, 94, 132, 227, 252, 271, 275. 



fHE BERLIN CONGRESS. 27 

Turkish commissioner in Bulgaria and the Consular 
delegates (article 6). The}^ were to be informed of the 
occasions when it was necessary to summon Ottoman 
troops into Roumelia and were to fix the amount of the 
Ottoman public debt that Servia and Montenegro were 
to bear for the new territories assigned to them by the 
treaty of Berlin (articles 16, 33, 42).' 

4. THE DANUBE COMMISSION. 

This had been created under the Treaty of Paris of 
1856 and by the Treaty of Berlin was maintained in its p^fjll,^,^^';,^^^;^. 
functions and "all the treaties, arrangements, acts, and'''''°<'°°^''°'*'^- 
decisions relating to its rights, privileges, prerogatives 
and obligations" were confirmed (articles 53-56). 

5. FINANCIAL COMMISSION. 

This was merely a recommendation, inserted in the ,ion®''°7"count 
protocol (No. 18) at the instance of Count Corti, that^°^"- 
there be established at Constantinople a commission' of 
specialists "charged to examine into the complaints of 
the bondholders of the Ottoman debt, and to propose 
the most efficacious means of satisfying them, as far as 
it is compatible with the financial situation of the Porte." 
(Protocols, p. 268.) 

6. MEDIATION OF THE POWERS. 

In the event of disagreement between Greece andatfrf^Jrvcd"^*^'' 
Turkey over the rectification of their frontier, the signa- 
tory powers reserved ''to themselves to offer their media- 
tion to the two parties to facilitate negotiation.'' 
(Article 24.) 

INFORMATIOX AND TECIIMCAL APPARATUS. 

In 1878. accurate information on the geographic, I'^-cial p^,-^g'==^?'^f'' ^y^^^ 
and social conditions of the Balkans was extremely ^■°°'^'^*°°'^ 
meager. Little was known of the distribution of popu- 

' At the session of .lul>' U the following draff resolution was unaniinoiisly agreed to 
by the Congress: '. 

"Tie olaaiootontiaries of the powers assembled in Congress at Berlin, moved by the 
reports which have reached sojae of them as to the present suffering of the population ^ 

of the Rholope anl of the neigliboriug countries, are of opinion that it is desirable to 
instruct the Am^jasiaiors at Constantinople to come to an agreement with the Sublime 
Porte for the iinme liate dispatch of a European Commission charged to verify on the 
spot the serious nature of the facts, and as far as possihle to remedy them." 

BisTiarc'c, howe.er, pointed out, with the assent of all, "that the members of the 
High A.s5embl ,', iu a'^ree^ng to this resolution foreign to the subject of their delilierations, 
are acting, not as nionlers of the Congress, but as representatives of their respective 
governments." (Protocols, p. 271.) 



28 THE BERLIN CONGBESS. 

and'^partisan!'^'''^^^^^^^^' '^^^^ Statistical and ethnographical data were so 
inexact that maps based upon them and submitted to 
support the respective contentions were characterized as 
"new instruments of diplomatic warfare," which did 
"more honor to the patriotic zeal than the scientific 
accuracy of those who construct them." (The Times, 
paoUy"ofpien^June 27. 1S78. Berlin Correspondence.)' Ackled to 
potcntiaries. jg^^.j. ^f information was the incapacity of the chief 
pl(Uiipotentiaries to deal with questions calling for even 
elementary technical knowledge. Schouvaloff has af- 
firmed that Gortchakoff "was incapable of pointing out 
on the map, even approximately, the different countries 
of the Balkan peninsula or * * * the position of 
Kars and Batoum," while Salisbury asserted that Bea- 
consfield had never seen a map of Asia Minor; and yet 
it was they who negotiated the agreement with respect 
to the Asiatic frontier.- This amazing ignorance of 
necessary geograpliical data, as Hohenlohe has recorded, 
affected even the Boundary Committee, though not to. 
the same degree. (See supra, p. 31.)^ 
congTess'"du\ to Difficulties repeatedly arose in plenary Congress from 
inaccurate data, ^.j^-g gource.-* During the controversy over Batoum, 
Gortchakoff estimated the Laze population of Lazistan 
The Lazes. ^^ 50,000, the British and Turkish plenipotentiaries, at 
four times that number (Protocols, p. 209), which dif- 
ference had to be reconciled in private interviews. 
When the Sandjak of Sofia was under final considera- 
tion, it was admitted that the map employed was not 
one upon w^hich to base definite decisions.^ And during 

'" The only suro practical conclusion which can be drawn * * * is that wc have 
as yet very little trustworthy information concerning the population of the Balkan 
peninsula. This important fact has been fully rccomizcd by the plenipotentiaries, and 
the Congress has thereby acquired a certain latitude in det(!rraining tlie frontiers of the 
various units of which Turkey in Europe is henceforth to be composed." The Times, 
June 27, 1878. (Berlin Correspondence.) 

2 Souvenirs of 1'. Schouvaloff quoted in Hanotiiu.x, Contemporary France, IV, p. 
3.53-3 )4. The complete citation throws an interesting sidelight on the methods of nego- 
tiation at the c.iugress. See Appendix HI. • ' 

3 See also Protocols, p. 269. 

* "July 9. * * * In the case of Sorvia the Cominis.sion was not agreed. We had 
to bring the question before the full meeting. Some natural confusion resulted. The 
Chancellor and the meeting had no idea what the point at i^sue wa=, and however 
clearly I repeatedly CKpIamed the matter, the questions, when it came to voting, were 
not always clearly put. The Commission was fnially instructed to deliberate once more 
on Branja, and once more to report pro:?ress." Hiheulohe, Memoirs, 11, p. 223. 

6 "The president is of opinion that it is dangerous to lay down in a treaty article a 
military route on ground which is little known and on a map the accuracy of which 
can not be relied upon. This delimitation might be inconvenient to thoLC who may 
ma^-e use of it. His Serene Higlmess * * * is of the opinion that, in accordance 
with the decisions * * * taV-en by the Congress, the delimitation should be dealt 
with by negotiations on the spot." Protocols, p. 275. 



THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 



29 



Authorities: 
Kicpert. 



Kanjtz. 



TcploiT. 



an earlier discussion of this same question, the con- 
tinued existence of the Congress was imperiled because 
of the discovery by the English plenipotentiaries that, 
through reliance upon an inaccurate map, they had (;on- 
ceded more than they had intended.^ 

The best authority on the ethnography of the Balkans 
at the time appears to have been Kiepert, whcTse work 
in German, according to Avril, was "neither complete nor 
free from error." ^ P'or descriptive accounts of Bulgaria 
and Servia the works of Kanitz were •available, and for 
the Dobriidja that of Peters, all in German. The best 
history of Bulgaria was by Jericek in Czechish, of which 
a German translation had been made. Among the sta- 
tistical compendiums from various sources, the Vieniui 
correpsondence of The Times commends that of Teploff, 
a Russian, which seems to have been much relied on by 
Turkey in its case against the treat}' of San Stefano 
(Tlie Times, June 21, 1878).'' The Times also speaks of 
a recent ethnographical map eiited by Carl Sax, the 
Austrian consul at Adrianople, and published by the 
Geogi"apliical Institute of Vienna as "a valuable atldition 
to the data at the disposal of the Congress." This was 
a more scientific work than its predecessors and had 
taken into account not only local differences of race and 
religion, but also the amalgamations that had been effected 
between various elements (The Times, June 21, 1878). 
Whether or not it was used to any extent d.oes not appeal- 
from the record. 

In defining boundaries in the Balkans the maps of the 
Austi*ian General staff were followed. (Treaty of Berlin, 
articles 2, 14, 28, 36.) A note appended to the draf t in^"^'-'"" '°^»''' 
treaty indicated that all the names of places had been 



Austrian niiips 
used. 



inaccurate. 



* "July 4. * * * In the Congress Beaconsfield and Salisbury had agreed that 
Bulgaria should have the Sandschak of So "a. They afterwards found that the Sand- 
schak e vtends far beyond the spurs of the Balkan and that they had conceded too much. 
They now wish to take that back a'^ain, and were quite unabashed. Schouvaloff pro- 
tested * * * ." Hoheulohe, Memoirs, II, pp. 219-220. 

' Avril, Negociations relatives au traite de Berlin, p. 318. 

"The ethnographic information which we have (of Bulgaria) is not authentic; it is 
incomplete. The best, with which we are the least familiar, is supplied by German 
bands in the Kiepert maps * * *." Kohl, Reden des Fursten Bismarck, VII, 
p. 83. 

'"The Golos of to-day publishes the French text received from Constantinople of 
the ethnographical protest of the Porte against tlie Bulgarian frontiers as fixed by the 
treaty of San Stefano. The Golos states that the document which will be submitted 
to the Congress by the Turki.sh plenipotentiaries is based upon Teplofl's Russian statis- 
tical work upon Bulgaria, but points out that the statistics given by Teploff are incor- 
rectly quoted by the compilers of the Turki.sh protest." The Times, June 24, 1878 
(Telegram from St. Petersburg). 



30 THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 

takcMi from the Austrian Staff map, but it was not con- 
sidered advisable that such statement appear in the 
treaty. As the explanation, however, was "very impor- 
tant," Bismarck was of opinion that it should be men- 
tioned in the protocol. (Protocols, p. 276.) For the 
frontiers of Asia-Minor Russian maps chiefly were used, 
but contributed little to exact knowledge of the territory, 
the Boun(hi)'y Committee confessing in one instance that 
they did not have the "maps and documents necessary 
to enable them to come to any decision." (Protocols, 
p. 269.)* 

PRINCIPLES APPLIED. 

From what has been already indicated, the principle 

underlying the work of the Congress will be easily ap- 

tilcation'?/fron- Parent — that of "strategical rectification of frontiers" 

tiers. without niiy necessary regard to racial affiliations or 

tionauf ^'Twrcd' ^''^^^'~*^^-^ aspirations.^ Nationality as a principle foimd 

little, if any, sincere support from the great powers, but 

was confined for its expression to the pious wishes of the 

smaller nations admitted by the grace of the Congress to 

state their claims or to the futile appeals of the Turkish 

mmtnoncomm^-P-^^^^P^^^-'^^^^^^^^-^ ^^ Parliament, the opposition tried 

taiin Parliament, to sQcurc from tlio British Government a pledge that the 

Balkaii settlement should be made not on the basis of 

"dynastic arrangements or geographical puzzles," but on 

the just principle of nationalities; but the Government 

Gortchakoff refused to make any definite engagement.* Gortchakoff, 

puts forwanl. - . ' . , ,-, i-^i •^ 

principle of " ma-m his uote communicatcd to Salisbury, April 13, 1878, 
tiohs." ' had advocated "majority of populations," as the prin- 

' t'The maps of that part of Armenia are so inaccurate and contradictory that it is 
difficult to settle the frontiers from here." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, p. 224. 

= At the sassion of June 17, Salishury made the followius; observations: 

«* * * It is our tis'.c to replace her [Turkey], not upon the footing of her former 
independence, for it would be impossible entirely to anniliilate the results ol the war 
but ta restore to her a relative independence which shall permit her efficaciously to 
protect the strategical, political and commercial interests of which she is to remain the ' 
guardian * * *. 

" England has never admitted * * * that it was necessary, in order to guarantee 
the populations of European Turkey against the abuses of the Government and against 
oppression, to detach them from the political supremacy of the Porte. This guarantee, 
which is to be of the very highest importance, requires rather the reform of the interna) 
administration than a political separation." Protocols, p. 24. 

'See the address of M. Delyannis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs before the 
Congress on June 29, and those of the Roumanian delegates on July 1. Protocols, pp. 
133-1,34, 151-lc3. 

"The first Ottoman plenipotentiary argues against the cession of Antivari to Monte 
negro. The Porte would have no objection to Spizza, but she maintains that .\utivari 
belongs to the Albanians, and that the Montenegrins would only be able to dwell there 
by force, against the wish of the population." Protocols, p. loCi. 

< Consult the debates on the supplementary estimate, Jan. 31-Feb. 7, 1>^7S (Ilansard- 
I'arliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 237, pp. 720-1313 passim.), esiiccially the speech 
of Sir William Vernon Harcourt (ibid., pp. 1114-1130). See Appendi.x IV. 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 31 

ciple to govern. ''Nothing," he maintamed, "more 
oqiiitable or rational could be imagined." ^ So, too, 
argued the Turks at the Congress, but to no purpose.^ 
The policy that was to control was set forth hi Salisbury's 
instructions to Lord Odo Russell oi June 8, 1878: 

"In the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, it ^^^[f '^^'j^{;°t''™: 
[Bulgaria] should not be allowed to extend south of the ^9^"^^'^^^°^ J^"g: 
Balkan range * * *. Great care * * * should''^"''' 
he taken that while every necessary safeguard is provided 
for the good government of the population, the political 
and military authority of the Sultan's Government is 
sufficiently secured to provide against the risk of this 
province being made the field of treasonable intrigue or 
the gate of an invading army * * *. It is very im- 
portant for the security of Constantinople that they [the . 
Turks] should continue to occu]\v the passes of the 
Balkans." ^ 

This policy of strategical and political considerations giJ°"ontiers'^ w- 
was early adopted by the Congress, nominally at the ^'°^p^^°* ^"^ '^™' 
instance of Austria, in reality on the insistence of Great 
liritain, and every page of the protocols testifies to its 
triumph.* Bismarck lost no opportunity to promote it i^^^s^m^^th"^ 
and of all the representatives at the Congress he was^'^j^^^j^^^ small 
most out of sympathy with the national aspirations of j^o^RPoses Rou- 
the small peoples. He opposed the admission of the 
Roumanian delegates, whose claims did not seem to 
him "of a nature to facilitate a good understanding," 
and supported Russia on the question of Bessarabia 

) British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, p. si7. 

Thus also Gortohakofl at the Congress: 

" Distributions of territory, proposed without regard to the principle of the majority 
of the population might be suggested not by considerations of race, but by particular 
views of political, geographical, or commercial interest. Russia having, as far as she 
herself is concerned, no material advantage to seek in these countries, can only estimate 
those various propositions ffom one point of view, viz., that of equity and concilitation, 
to which she is always inclined, with a view to the consolidation of an European agree- 
ment and of general peace." Protocols, p. 36. See also ibid., pp. 24-25. 
' ^"* * * The Quadrilateral [should] be left in a mihtary sen.se at least in their 
ITurkish] possession — a thing they deem themselves all the more entitled to, as there 
can not be the least doubt that the majority of the population thereabouts is Mohammes 
dan. They think that while thus shaping out the new Bulgaria more in conformity 
w^ith the principle of race they might have a far better line of defense than if the Balkan, 
were chosen as such." The Times, June 20, 1878. (Vienna Correspondence.) 

' British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, pp. 834-835. 

■« "Moreover, a pjint which will avert many difficulties has been obtauied by Austria 
1% has been thoroughly agreed that questions of strategic interest shall have precedence, 
over all ethnographical considerations, so long used in the Eastern Question to suit 
the fancies of ambitious persons. As soon as the settlement of any matter is arrived 
at, the piitthig of it into execution will be primarily determined by cfflcers frcm a thcr- 
(ftighly strategical point of view * * * jn this way the line round Sofia is considera- 
bly reduced, whereas on ethnographical groimds it would have been much more extended 
;»nd might have menaced the road frcm Salonica.'' The Times, Ju!iei24, 1878. (Berlin 
Corre,spondence). See also The Times, July 1, 1878. 



32 THE BERLIN OONGRESS. 

(Protocols, pp. 135-138). He was careful to impress 
ie?es™'*'of ''"the upon the Congress that the privileges accorded to the 
Greeks. Greek representatives were strictly limited (ibid, p. 38). 

Anneman^Vues-Th^ proposal of Salisbmy that the Armenian question 
*'""■ should be given its day in court produced in the Chaut 

Indifferent to cellor a notable burst of impatience/ whUe his indifference 

Balkan States. _ ' ' 

to the ultimate welfare of the Balkans was only exceeded 
by his studied incivility toward the Turks.- 
taine(?°^aras1st '^^ state it exactly, however, no power maintained any 
enee of principle, ,^^3 principle Consistently throughout, but took its ])osi- 
tion on each cjuestion according to its particular conce])t 
sa^'^orts natiojr^^ diplomatic expediency. Thus Great Britain, insisting 
tnd^Bxtoum'^'^''''''^M^on strategic frontiers in the delin\itation of Bulgaria, 
urged ethnographical considerations for the Greeks and 
for Batoum (Protocols, pj). 22, 24, 208), although, in 
the case of Greece, these arguments were not pursued 
by the British plenipotentiaries with especial zeal, the 
Greeks being told by Beaconsfield that ''states, like 
individuals, which have a future, are in a position to 
Russia .icries it ^ya^i^," (ibid., p. 198). Russia, on the other hand, loud 
Batoum. jj^ i^Qj. professions of respect for the principle of nation- 

ality, had defied it in the treaty of San Stefano and played 
counter to it when her vital interests were involved at 
Berlin, especially in the cessions cf Bessarabia and 
Austria's poi-gatoum.'' Of the interested great i)owers, Austria came 

icy — occupation ^ ' ' 

of Bosnia-Herze- jjga^Pgg^ l^^ a uniform policy. According to Hohenlohe, 
Andrassy told Waddington that he "must occupy Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at any price" (Memoirs, II, p. 213).. 

1 "Lord Salisbury announced a proposal as to the Armenians which brought thft- 
remark, 'Encore un de plus!' from the Chancellor." Hohenl he, Memoirs, p. 230. 

"The President observes that il is. perhaps, difficult to carry out repressive measures 
among independent tribes, and His Serene Highness raises doubts as to the practical 
efficacy of the article proposed by Lord Salisbury." Protocals, p. 210. 

2 ''His Serene Highness thinks that the Congress is not in a positinn to find a -emedy 
for all these dangers. If the Bulgarian population, either through ill will or innate, 
incapacity, can not make their new institutions work, Europe will in truth be obliged, 
to take cotmsel, but later on and when that time shall have arrived * * *. To take, 
into consideration contingent questions relative to the future of Bulgaria, which interests 
Germany and doubtless some of the Powers here represented, only in view of the question: 
of the general peace, would be to extend the task of the Congress beyond its limits." 
Protocols, p. 04. 

Hohenlohe, commenting on this "attack * * * on the peoples of the Balkan 
peninsula," says that the Chancellor "was quite indifferent tothefateof these peoples." 
Memoirs, II, p. 215. 

3 " It is thought this evening that the question of the Lazes has a more serious import 
than was generally believed * * *. The Russians object to a warhke pcpulation 
sheltered by mountains just without their new possession." The Times, July 8, 187S 
(Berlin correspondence). 

" Batoum had not surrendered, nor was it handed over to the Russians till September. 
6, 1878, after protests on the part otthe population, whi.'h at one time threatened serioua 
consequences." T. E. Holland, Studies in Internatif nal 1 aw, p. 244. 

For a fuller discussion of nationality and the Batoum frontier, see Appendix V. 



THE BEBLIN CONGEESS. 33 

But her designs went further. She was out to c'^t^'^ and'ytont^egvo. 
the vigorous young peoples just beginning to reahze 
statehood/ and in this she succeeded, thanks to the 
forward-looking policy of Bismarck and the near-sighted 
acquiescence of Great Britain. But Austria's aim, as 
expressed in the language of her first plenipotentiary, 
appeared unimpeachable. It was to create a "state of 
affairs which shall give the greatest possible chance of 
duration and stability." (Protocols, p. 48.) How durable 
and how stable, the Bosnian coup of 1908 and the tragedy 
of Serajevo grimly attest! 

To sum up, the Congress, tlii'ough those controlling ^Jjj^o^^.l^^t^ii.'^g 
its decisions, was animated by but two considerations : (1) Eiro|ean '°°con- 
That collective Europe alone can dignify claims of '^'^^tp^.p^^j.^j^^j^^ 
nationality with recognition,^ and (2) that, in the words ^[g°tjty°™^°s°'^*^'"~ 
of Beaconsfield at the sitting of June 22, "it remains 
established, in fact, by unanimous assent, that the 
Sultan, as a member of the political body of Europe, is 
to enjoy a position which shall secure to him the respect 
of his sovereign rights." (Protocols, p. 43.)^ 

GENERAL CONDUCT OF BUSINESS. 

From the technical point of view the Congress of Berlin 
was a model of orderly procedure and definite results, j^^^^pj'^^^^^ffjjf. 
The personalitv of Bismarck, then in the vigor of his'''*"-^- 

, " 1 1 Ti • 1- • Businfiss du-ec- 

inteUectual powers, gave to the deliberations a direction tion given by 

1 , » . 1 . Bismarck. 

which made for accurate, pertinent, and summary busi- 
ness arrangements. The Chancellor, however, was in 
iU health at the time, and for that reason a somewhat ^a^te'due to sfs- 
rapid tempo, if not outright impatience, maybe detected, ™^^^^^'^^^^^'*^" 

1 "June 19. Blowitz came to me this morning. He said he was beginning to be un- 
easy about the result of the Congress. Austria was showing more determinalif n and 
resolution than he had hitherto credited her with. She did not at all wish that Monte- 
negro should be allowed to receive Antivari, and that the Serbs, with Bosnia and Mon- 
tenegro, should proclaim an empire under Nikita * * *. Austria wishes * * * 
tobeforced to invade those countries * * *." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 212. 

2 "Prince Bismarck observes that the question is whether or not the powers are agreed 
to recognize the independence of Roumania * * *. Europe alone has the power to 
sanction independence. She has then to ask herself under what ccnditirns she will 
adopt that important derision, and if she considers that these conditions shall be the 
sameasthosealreadyestablished by the Congress in the case of Servia." Protocols, p. 153. 

3 Beaconsfield elaborated this point of view at the session of July 5, in part, as follows: 
"His Excellency, seeking for the motives of this attitude [the expectant attitude of 

Greece] thinks that it should be attributed to the false idea that was formed, after the 
conclusion of the treaty of San Stefano, as to tlie principles which sliould guide tlie Con- 
gress, An erroneous opinion attributed to the Congress the intention to proceed to the 
partition of a worn-out state (etat ^^eilli), and not to strengthen, as the high assembly 
has done, an ancient empire which it considers essential to the maintenance of peace. 
It is true that often after a great war, territorial rearrangements are brought about 

* * *. The word "partition" can not be applied to such arrangements and retro- 
cessions, and the Greek Government was entirely mistaken as to the ^n.ews of Europe 

* * *." Protocols, p. 197. 

88264—18 3 



34 THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 

even in the colorless statements of the protocols.^ At 
the sixth session, Bismarck, urging the Congress to avoid 
discussion of details, alluded to "the state of his health, 
which will not permit of his assisting at many more 
meetings" (Protocols, p. 79), and during the pourparlers 
over Batoum he flatly announced that if a settlement 
was not arrived at in 24 hours, he would leave for the 
more restful atmosphere of Kissengen.- 
drawafot^power ^^^^ Consideration gave Bismarck pause and set a 
S. ^^'^ ^°°"Umit to his complete domination of the Congress. In the 
background there was always looming up the possible 
withdrawal of one or more of the powers and the conse- 
Attitude ofquent rupture of the negotiations. Here the British 
plenipotentiaries had the weather gage. Austria might 
wish to employ that stratagem, but, in the opinion of 
competent observers, would not have taken the initiative 
herself. Great Britain, however, was prepared to follow 
a line of her own.^ During the discussions on Bulgaria, 
the British plenipotentiaries presented a virtual ulti- 
matum of four points, which the Russians took ad 
Disraelis couf,. referendum. Meanwhile, having concluded that Russia 
could not yield the points, Disraeli had decided to leave 
the Congress and had gone to the length of ordering by 
telegram a special train from Cologne, Bismarck 
heard of it, promptly intervened with a personal call at 
Beaconsfield's hotel, and at the next session the surrender 
of Russia was complete.^ 
soCTef^°^^ agree- Other difficulties beset the Congress, but Bismarck met 
ments. them all. The disclosure of secret agreements, especially 

the Anglo-Russian convention of May 30, had such a 
reaction in Great Britain, and so directly affected the 
position of the British plenipotentiaries at the Congress, 

1 "July 5. * * * This impatience on the part of the chancellor, which is justified 
by his state of health, accelerates the work, but its disadvantages will be felt later, since 
much will only be superficially settled. I should prefer slower work." Hohenlohe, 
Memoirs, II, pp. 220-221. 

2 Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, p. 354. 

3 "June 19. Blowitz came to me this morning. He said he was beginning to be uneasy 
about the result of the Congress * * *. It might * * * happen that Austria 
became dissatisfied and might contemplate the possibility of leaving the Congress. But 
she did not wish to act thus alone, and had therefore sounded England to see if she also 
was prepared to retire from the Congress in case the necessary ccncessicns in Bulgaria, 
were not made her. The Englishmen had not answered that. Blowitz thought it 
would be a very good thing if the Englishmen's demands were satisfied, for then there 
would be a. certainty that Austria would not by herself abandon the Congress. England, 
however, whether she was left alone or was dissatisfied, would not be in the least per- 
turbed at the idea of abandoning the Congress alone." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 212. 

* For the authentic account of this incident, see A. N. Cumming, Secret History of the 
Berlin Treaty, in Nineteenth Century and After, vol. .58 (IfOo), pp. 83-eO. This is a 
transcript of a conversation with Lord Rowton (Montagu Corry), who attended the 
Congress as Disraeli's private secretary. See Appendix VI. 



THE BEKLIN CONGEESS. 35 

that it required all the skill at the command of the 
Chancellor to secure a compromise and avoid a break.^ 

Then there was the personal equation. Gortchakoff ^J^^^Ilfy^^^^^fP^F- 
was ill, vain, and fond of attention, Disraeli, quizzical 
and inchned to' pose. Feeling showed itself at times, 
even between members of the same delegation.? 
Bismarck, however, played upon them all with a sure 
touch.^ Even their differences were sometimes fomented 
by the Chancellor ''in order to have the pleasure of 
•arranging them." But he always kept his eye on a settle- 
ment. Bismarck wished for peace' at the time, having 
already secured what he had designed to get by the ous for peace. 
sword. Thus, while he put Russia ''on the stool of 
repentance" he aimed not to make reconciliation with 
Germany impossible. France he treated with courteous 
consideration.^ Great Britain was given a dignified, if of ™e power^^°* 
frigid, respect. Only the Turks met with uniform rebuff, 
having on most questions, in Bismarck's view, "neither 
an opinion to offer nor a decision to take in Congress." 
(Protocols, p. 270.) ' 

But with all his gruff imperiousness, Bismarck showed Bismarck's tact 
tact in the essentials and it was due to his keen instinct '"''' ^^^^^^'^^^^^y- 
for the conduct of affairs and his profound knowledge of 
human nature that the Congress was carried to a success- 
ful issue. The plenipotentiaries may have played at real 

1 See Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, pp. 350-351. 

2 "June 25. SchuwalofE told me before yesterday's sitting he had on the day before 
prevented a telegram from Gortchakoff being sent, in which the latter wished to state 
to the Emperor of Russia that he was ill, and could not therefore accept the responsibility 
for the last resolutions. Schuwaloff declared that, if this telegram went, he would 
telegraph to the Emperor asking him to send another plenipotentiary. The telegram 
was therefore stopped." Hohcnlohe, Memoirs, H, p. 215. 

"Julys. * * * Haymcrle reported on the frontiers of Montenegro. In this connec- 
tion he read a printed list of the various points, which was incomplete. St. Vallier 
called his attention to the defect. Andrassy was indignant that his Austrian colleague 
should have made himself ridiculous, and muttered some uncomplimentary remark 
* * *." Ibid., p. 220. ■ • 

« Thus Schouvaloff writes of him: 

" Priace Bismarck presided over the Congress with a certain military brusquencss 
of manner which did not displease those present and which the representatives of all" 
the Powers took in good part, the two English Ministers not excepted, from whom I 
had awaited more haughtiness." Cited in Hanotaux, op. cit., p. 347. 

And Caratheodory Pasha remembers him with reason, as follows: 

"The Congress of Berlin was completely dominated by Prince Bismarck * * *. 
The confidence and fear that he inspired were general * * *. Long accustomed to 
the most complete independence, he looked upon the slightest observation as a desire 
for resistance which he hastened to suppress with nervous impatience and a will of 
iron." Cited ibid. 

"His incontestable superiority, the awe that he inspired amongst the be-medaled 
and be-ribboned dignitaries that surrounded him, ought to have made him more indul- 
gent. The individualities of these lofty personages aroused his formidable criticism. 
Beaconsfield was not spared any more than was Gortchakoff. He only mocked at 
their solemn methods of procedure, their romantic and slightly old-fashioned ways." 
Ibid, p. 353. 

♦ See also Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, pp. 209-210. 



36 THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 

business, but the correct forms and formulas were care- 
fully observed. In tlie outward unanimity and technical 
precision of the Berlin Congress the European Concert 
achieved its masterpiece. 

THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES. 

At Berlin, as always in great international settlements, 
a sanction for the execution of the negotiated treaty had 

tm'"/."''° ^°' *^^ to be considered by the plenipotentiaries. It was brought 
before the Congress in a direct way by Prince Gortchakoflf 

deSarat'ion.^'""^^^ the session of July 8, in a formal declaration expressing 
the wish that the work, "wrought in a spirit of concilia- 
tion, may secure to Europe a solid and durable peace." 
,After pointing out Russia's special interest in preventing 
the recurrence of periodic crises in eastern Europe, the 
First Plenipotentiary of Russia asked the Congress "by 
what principle and in what manner it proposes to insure 
the execution of its high decision." ' This communica- 
tion was placed on the order of the day for the next ses- 
sion (July 9), but discussion on that occasion was 
adjourned until a definite proposal had been formulated 
by the Russian delegation as follows: 

"Europe having given her most solemn and binding 

sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the 

High Contracting Parties regard the totality of the 

Russian propo- articles of the present act as forming a combination of 

sal for guarantees. . , . ^ c i • i i 

stipulations the execution of which they engage to con- 
trol and superintend, while insisting on their being 
carried out entirely in conformity with their intentions. 
"They reserve to themselves the right to come to an 
understandmg, in case of need, as to the requisite means 
to insure a result which neither the general interests of 
Europe nor the dignit}^ of the Great Powers permit them 
to leave invalid." Protocols, p. 253. ^ 

1 "Russia is especially interested in this. She has made great sacrifices during the 
war; she has made considerable ones with a view to tlie reestablish ment of peace and 
of the maintenance of the good understanding of Eui'ope. She has the right to expect 
that at any rate these sacrifices shall not be made gratuitously, and that the work of 
which they have laid the foundations shall not be fruitless, thi'ough want of execution, 
as have been the previous attempts at pacification in the East * * *. The plenipo- 
tentiaries of Russia are persuaded that this thought is shared equally by the High 
Assembly, and that it would not raise an ephemeral structure which would expose 
the peace of the East and of Europe to fresh dangers." Protocols, p. 232. 

■•'"Lord Salisbury having asked whether the terms of this proposition imply the 
necessity of employing a foreign force in case the treaty be not carried into efl"ect, the 
President declares that in his opinion this could not be the case. In the opinion of 
the President, the Powers engage themselves only to an active superintendence, to be 
followed, in case of need, by diplomatic action. The second part of the document 
reserves, it is true, to the Powers the faculty of coming to an understanding as to the 
means of ulterior action, but, at the same time, without imposing any obligation on 
any of them." Ibid, p. 253. 



THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 37 

Considerable debate over this formula submitted by ^,p5j\^^''f°''®s °f 
Gortchakoff took place at the sitting of July 10, but its 
real consideration went over to the following session 
(July 11). The differences of opinion were fundamental. 
Caratheodory thought that sufficient sanction had been flif^f. linnet ion to 
already created in the shape of European commissions. ^^°g'^^^'^'^^°'P°^^'- 
For the rest, the execution of the stipulations should be 
made to depend upon the bona fides of the signatory 
powers. Under the Russian proposal, the Porte would 
find itself obliged "to admit within its limits the control 
of other states, and in turn to exercise a control in other 
states having the same engagements" (Protocols, p. 
265) — obligations too "novel and weighty" for the Turk- 
ish Government to assume. The Russian delegation, in tinn"^ouid''refn- 
support of the proposal, saw "nothing but good in sur-^'^''^® t^« *''^^^y- 
rounding with every guarantee of efficacy a treaty con- 
cluded by the most eminent statesmen in Europe," and 
"had solely in view the maintenance of the dignity of 
the European stipulations." (Protocols, pp. 239-240, 
253.) Salisbury was against the insertion of such a gifl^^f ^''^y:^^™^] 
declaration in the treaty, and knew "of no sanction more ^^'^''^^^ ""^ '"^^®- 
'solemn' and 'binding' than the signature of his Govern- 
ment," for which reason he proposed not to accept an 
engagement which appeared to him " either to be useless 
* * * or to have a signification of too undefined a bear- 
ing." (Ibid. T). 265.) The same objections, in more 
elaborated argument, were urged by Waddington, who gp^^^^^^ef f/fif- 
f eared that the clauses of the treaty might become, " under ^f^^f* intenen- 
the action of a control decreed by the Congress, a series 
of pretexts for an incessant interference in all the acts 
of the Sublime Porte." (Ibid., p. 266.) ^ 

Andrassy thought the proposal of Gortchakoff should ^j^^°^r^|^^^^oflers 
be abbreviated. The second paragraph, in his opinion, 
"might be interpreted as a want of confidence on the 
part of the Congress in the result of its labors," and, in 
the sense of his criticism, he offered an amendment.^ 
Bismarck, while giving, aloiig with the other German g^^i^t "^ owisa''- 
plenipotentiaries, the only vote in favor of the Russian t°^y "'^ °^ ^°^''®- 

'"July 12. * * * Full meeting at 2 o'clock. The proposal of Gortchakoff as to a 
formal and grandiloquent concluding paragraph was negatived. Gortchakoff was 
much annoyed. Waddington remarked, with his customary bon sens: 'Either it is 
verbiage, in which case the article is superfluous, or it has some meaning — then it is 
dangerous.' " Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 225. 

2 Andrassy's amendment was as follows: 

"The high contracting powers look upon the totality of the articles of the present act 
as fo.-ming acallectioaotstipulitious, of wliichthey undertake to control and to superin- 
tend the execution." Protocols, pp. 264-265. 



38 THE BEEI.IN CONGRESS. 

proposal (as modified by Schoiivaloff) , had, on the occa- 
sion of Gortchakoff's earlier declaration, crystallized the 
opinion of the Congress against any sanction implying 
the obligatory use of force on the part of each state 
separately. On the other hand, on his view of it, "if 
the powers engaged themselves jointly to use force at 
need, they w^ould risk the provocation among themselves 
of grave disunion."' He merely contented himself with 
having no objection to the recognition, in a special article, 
that " the powers may reserve to. themselves the right to 
erx^a^foTof rigM control by their agents the execution of the resolutions 
to control. ^ q£ ^j^^ ]^-gj^ assembly." (Protocols, p. 240.) 
amcmdment ^de^- Both the Russian proposal and the Austrian amend- 
feated. Hient failed to secure the assent of the Congress. The 

results, consequently, of the discussions thereon w^ere, as 
stated by Bismarck and entered on the protocol, ''the 
proposal itself, the answ^ er of the Porte, and the decisions 
of the Congress to take note of the declarations of the 
First Ottoman Plenipotentiary." (Protocols, p. 267.) 

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION OF 
TREATY. 

The concluding session of the Congress was devoted to 
trelvty °*°^ "Hhe signing of the treaty. All the plenipotentiaries were 
present, in uniform, and each signed seven copies, w'hich 
had been prepared. But inasmuch as it is ratification, 
not signature, of a treaty that gives it validity, the 
question had arisen at the session of July 12, ''in what 
form and at what date the treaty shall be communicated 
to the states concerned who have not taken part in the 
Congress." The sense of the discussion was that official 
communication could not be nuide until after exchange 
of ratifications, which was to take place "within three 
w^eeks, or sooner if possible." It was thought advisable, 
however, that these states should at once be informed of 
the arrangements affecting .them, and, accordingly, the 
president was authorized "to make known, after the 

1 " Prince Bismarck does not believe that it is possible to find a formula which would 
guarantee Europe absolutely against the recurrence of those matters which have dis- 
turbed her. * * * 

"The Congress can perform only a human work, subject, like every other, to the fluc- 
tuation of events * * * . Prince Bismarck does not think that beforehand the 
Congress can be supposed to imagine that the resolutions, taken solemnly, by all Europe 
united, would not be executed. It would be necessary to wait for an infraction in order 
to take notice of it, and in this case the powers, warned by their representatives at Con- 
stantinople, could arrange to appeal to new diplomatic assemblies." Protocols, p. 240. 



THE BERLIN CONGRESS. • 39 

signature, to the States interested, tlie decisions which 
concerned them in an authentic draft, but communi- 
cated in an unofficial form." (Protocols, p. 277.) TheformSoM: 
complete treaty was transmitted to them, officially, after ^^offieiaiiy after 
ratifications had been exchanged. ratification. 

The final act in the negotiations was efTected at Berlin, 
August 3, 1878, in a proces-verbal recording the ex- i-ecordrng" ^"ex- 
change and signed by the representatives of the. signa- fltims, ° August 
tory powers accredited to the Court of Berlin, or by^'^^'*^' 
secretaries authorized to sign ad hoc.^ The Turkish 
instruments of ratification had not arrived, but the 
Turkish ambassador announced that his Government 
had ratified and that he would be prepared to make the 
exchange for Turkey within 15 days. When this was 
done in good and due form, the labors of the Berlin 
Congress were officially at an end.^ 

1 Foi* the prooes-verbal, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, p. 768. 

2 "Each diplomatic representative received a copy of this proces-verbal in which his 
sovereign was named first and his own signature attached first, the others being placed 
in the alphabetical order of the countries represented, according to the French language. " 
SatOvV, Diplomatic Practice, II, p. 253. 



Appendix I. 

REPRESENTATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN. 

GERMANY. 

Plenipotentiaries. — Prince Bismarck, Under-Secretary of State von 
Billow, Ambassador Prince Holienlohe-Schillingfiirst. 

Secretaries. — Privy Councillor of Legation Biiclier, Envoy von 
Radowitz, Councillors of Legation Busch, and Baron Holstein, 
Secretaries of Legation Von Biilow, Count Herbert Bismarck, Count 
Rantzan, Lieut.-Col. Bliihme of the Prussian General Staff. 

AUSTRIA. 

Plenipotentiaries. — -Count Andrassy, Ambassador Count Karolyi, 
Privy Councillor Baron Haymerle. 

Secretaries. — Chief of Section Baron Schwegel, Envoy Herr von 
Teschenberg, Councillors Baron Hiibner, Von Kosiek, Doczy, Von 
Ascher, Secretary Von Peschy, Councillor of Embassy Baron von 
Mayr, Councillor of Legation Baron Pasette. 



Plenipotentiaries. — M. Waddington, Ambassador Comte de St. 
Vallier. 

Secretaries. — M. Despres,^ Director of Political Affairs of the 
Foreign Office; M. Duclerc, Assistant Division Chief; Secretaries of 
Embassy, Comte de Moiiy, Fourchon, Paul Despres de la Motte, 
Attaches Comte Montalivet, Viscount de Beaucaire, M. Darmet. 

GREAT BRITAIN. 

Plenipotentiaries. — Lord Beaconsfield, Marquis of Salisbury, Lord 
Odo Russell. 

Secretaries. — Mr. Montagu Corry, Mr. Philip Currie, Mr. Henry 
Neville Dering, Mr. Hertslet, Mr. Algernon Turnor, Mr. Austin Lee, 
Hon. J. Bertie, Hon. Eric Barrington, Mr. Chas. Hopwood, Mr. 
E. Le Marchant Gosselin, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Lieut. Gen. Sir 
Lintorn Simmons, Capt. Edwards, Capt. Ardagh, Capt. Fitz-George, 
Lord Cranborne, Mr. E. B. M. Mallet. 

^M. Deprez was not a secretary, as The Times here states, but Third French 
Plenipotentiary. See supra, p. 9, note 1. 

41 



4*2 THE BEELIN CONGEESS. 



Plenipotentiaries. — Count Corti, Ambassador Count Launay. 
Secretaries. — Councillors of Embassy Curtopassi and Chevalier 
Tosi, Secretaries Marquis Bialbi, Marquis de Malaspina. 



Plenipotentiaries. — Prince Gortchakoff, Ambassador Count Schou- 
valoff, Ambassador Baron d'Oubril. 

Secretaries. — Privy Councillor Baron Jomini, Councillor of -State 
Baron Fredericks, Secretary of Legation Count Adlerberg, Coun- 
cillors Sorokine and Ivanoff of the Asiatic Department of the St. 
Peterburg Ministry of Foreign Affau-s, Gen. Anjutschin, Colonels 
Bobrikofl' and Bogoluboff . 

TURKEY. 

Plenipotentiaries. — Alexander Caratheodory Pasha, Ambassador 
SadouUah Bey, Gen. Mehemet Ali Pasha. 

Secretaries. — Parnies Effendi, Councillor to the Minister of Foreign 
Affau's; Feridoun Bey, Division Chief of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Secretary of Embassy Ohan Bagdadlian, Matchik Effendi, 
Navum Effendi, Division Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Col. Izzet Bey, Mr. Parnis, an English jurist. 

(From The Times, June 13 and 14, 1878.) 



Appendix II. 



DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, MARCH 11, 1878, ON THE PRESI- 
DENCY OF THE PROPOSED CONGRESS. 

Earl Stanhope in rising, according to notice, to ask the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, in the event of the ensuing 
conference taking place at Berlin, he will urge that under no circum- 
stances is it desirable that the representative of either of the bel- 
ligerents should preside, said: 

My Lords, I am aware that it is the general practice, when a conference or a congress 
takes place abroad, that the representative of the country in which the congress is 
held should preside. We have heard that the coming conference — if it is to be held 
at all — will take place at Berlin. It follows, therefore, that Prince Bismarck will 
preside. My Lords, I saw on Thursday last in the Allegemeine Zeitung a statement 
to the effect that the condition of the Prince's health is such that he is not likely to 
fulfil this arduous duty; and, in that case, supposing he does not, what will happen? 
I think, my Lords, it is possible — nay, even likely — that the senior representative 
of the great powers, Prince Gortchakoff, the senior in age, and therefore i^in experience, 
may be called upon to take the chair. I might be told this is most unlikely; but 
when we consider how long and intimate a friendship has existed between the German 
Chancellor and Prince Gortchakoff — an intimacy commencing 28 years ago at Frank- 
fort — when one reflects how it has produced the most tremendous results which have 
ever altered the map of Europe, it is very important that some attempts should be 
made to avert such a contingency. (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 
238, pp. 1036-1037.) 

The Earl of Derby: 

* * * My noble friend is no doubt aware that generally — I believe invariably — 
at all congresses and conferences that have been held in recent times, the rule has 
been that the representatives themselves, on their first meeting, should elect the 
person who should be their president, and settle the course of their future proceedings. 
A further custom has also grown up which, by lapse of time, has acquired almost the 
force of a rule, that, unless there be a special reason to the contrary, the representative 
of the power in the capital of whose country the conference or congress is held is the 
person elected for the purpose. It would, therefore, follow, that if the congress was 
held at Berlin, the presidency would probably be offered to Prince Bismarck; and 
I have no reason to suppose that, if he attends the congress at all, it would be his 
intention to decline it. If he were to do so, I apprehend that, according to usage, 
what would happen would be this — that the congress would proceed in the same 
manner as bafore to choose another president. I ought to add that, as far as 1 am 
awir3 or cin learn, there is no special power or authority attached to the position of 
the president on such an occasion. He is primus inter pares . It is simply an honorary 
distinction. Ha has precisaly the same rights and powers of dealing with subjects 
submitted to the conference that any other member has. Under those circumstances I 

43 



44 THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 

do not think it would be desirable to do that which certainly would be a very unusual 
step — to make it a condition of going into the congress that special rules of exclusion 
from the presidency should be applied to the representatives of one of the powers 
principally concerned. I am not aware that there is any precedent for a course of 
that kind being followed, and it is clear that no general rule can be laid down for the 
exclusion of the representatives of the belligerents. There have been cases, and there 
may be so again, of conferences attended by the representatives of the belligtrent 
powers alone, and if a universal rule of exclusion were to be applied to them, there 
would be no person to preside at a conference. (Hansard, op. cit., pp. 1039-1040.) 



Appendix III. 

(See supra, p. 28, note 2.) 

Prince Gortclaakoff, however brilliant he may have been at one time of his life, 
was not a man of business. He was skillful over phrasing, but kept always to gen- 
eralities, and I do not exaggerate in affirming that before his failure of health he was 
incapable of pointing out on the map, even approximately, . the different countries 
of the Balkan peninsula, or, for instance, the position of Kars and Batoum. When 
the prince talked business he liked to "tracer les magistrales," as he expressed it; 
in short, as he also said, to generalize. * *. * Lwas, therefore, considerably alarmed 
when he informed me one fine day that he had given up all other questions to me, 
but that he specially reserved that of Batoum to himself. * * * He could deal 
with it directly with Lord Beaconsfield. * * * The Congress was drawing to a 
close. * * * Prince Bismarck, anxious to set off to Kissingen, endeavored to 
bring matters to a settlement and questioned me daily as to whether an agreement 
on the Asiatic frontier had been arrived at between Russia and Great Britain. I 
told him that Prince Gortchakoff had reserved this negotiation for his own handling. 
I made tlie same communication to the Marquis of Salisbmy, who was drawing me 
very closely, and he replied with some vexation: "My dear Count, Lord Beacons- 
field can not negotiate! He has never seen a map of Asia Minor! " * * * Prince 
Bismarck at last announced that if we were not ready -w-ithin the next 24 hom-s he 
would start off. A few hoius afterwards we heai'd to our relief that a complete agree- 
ment had been arrived at between Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortchakoff. The 
prince promised to announce it at the next sitting of the congress. 

It must be stated, in order to understand what follows, that each of us possessed a 
map of Asia on which our Hat major had traced the frontier of the treaty of San Stefano 
in one particular color, and another line of different color to show the ne -plus ultra of 
what the plenipotentiaries could yield to the insistence of Great Britain. Needless to 
add, the second line was, to some extent, a state secret. 

This last assembly, devoted to the Asiatic question, was a serious occasion. On 
its result hung the issues of peace or war. The president suggested that the two 
negotiators, Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortchakoff, should sit side by side to point 
out the tenure of their agreement. The two gentlemen therefore took their places, 
each one spreading out before Mm a map traced for the occasion. We others stood in 
a group behind them. I at once foresaw the trouble and confusion that would ensue. 
Gortchakoff's map had one line only, that of San Stefano, and the prince declared 
emphatically that "my lord " had accepted it. Beaconsfield, however, replied to the 
prince's declaration by a laconic "No, no!" and pointed out, on his own map the 
line to which he had consented. Now, to my great astonishment, this line in all its 
sinuosities, was precisely the one that we had the right to accept as the extreme limit 
of our agreement. 

The contradiction between the two plenipotentiaries tended to embitter the dis- 
cussion. Each stood obstinately by his own line, when Prince Gortcliakoff got up, 
seized my hand, and said to me: "There is some treachery; they have had the map of 
our etat major. ^' 

I learned afterwards that on the previous day Gortchakoff had asked for a map of 
Asia Minor. He was given the confidential map of the two lines. He showed it to 
Lord Beaconsfield, lending it to him for a few hours so that Lord Salisbiu-y could see it. 

45 



46 THE BERLIN CONGEESS. 

The Englishmen, noticing a line that threw back the frontier of San Stefano, 
had adopted it for their own map. This was the explanation of the imagined 
treachery. * * * 

The president of the Congress, perceiving the two negotiators more and more 
entangled in their difficulty, ironically suggested compromise: The congress should 
be suspended for the space of half an hour, during which the second German plenipo- 
tentiary, Prince voji Hohenlohe, should put the matter to the vote. * * * 
Well, the matter tm'ned to oiu" advantage. I stood by the line of San Stefano, the 
Marquis of Salisbiuy to the ne plus ultra traced by our etat major. Prince von Hohen- 
lohe proposed a middle Line wliich would divide that under dispute into two equal 
parts. I accepted, and the question was decided. We signed the treaty two days 
afterwards. (From Souvenirs of P. Schouvaloff, quoted in Hanotaux, Contemporary 
France, Vol. IV, pp. 353-355.) 



Appendix IV 



Sir William Vernon Harcoiirt on the principle of nationality 
(Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 237, pp. 1127-1130): 

* * * But what is the true principle upon which you ought to go into this 
congress? I think if you want to get a permanent settlement of Europe, you should 
see what are the causes which have destroyed the previous settlement. The Treaty 
of Vienna of 1815 was negotiated by great statesmen. There were giants in the land 
in tho.'=e days; but they made a gigantic blunder, and their work has failed. The 
Treaty of Vienna was signed 12 years before I was born, and in my lifetime I have 
seen every bit of it torn into fragments. The chain first broke where it was weakest, 
for a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. It broke in Greece. The emanci- 
pation of Greece under the influence of England, was the fii'st breach in the Treaty of 
Vienna. Then followed the emancipation of Belgium; then that of Italy; then came 
the Holstein affaii-, and then the break-up of the German Confederation at the battle 
of Sadowa, and it was completed at the battle of Sedan. Why has the Treaty of Vienna 
failed? Because the negotiations were founded upon principles which were radically'^ 
false. It had relation only to dynastic arrangements and geographical puzzles. It 
was made to suit the ambition of rulers, and it neglected altogether the interests and 
the sympathies of nationalities and populations. I do not wonder that the negotiators 
at Vienna made that mistake, fatal as it was. When after the deluge of the French 
Revolution, the spires of ancient institutions began to appear out of the flood, it was 
not unnatural that a different view should be taken from what is taken now; but the 
edifice was built of untempered mortar; it has broken down, and it now lies in ruins. 
What is it that has broken down that edifice; what is it that has worked like leaven 
in the lump; what is it that has destroyed the Treaty of 1815? It is the principle of 
nationalities. What is it that has made Prince Bismarck so strong in Europe? It is 
not his armies, great as they are; but it is because he has had the courage and the 
wisdom to grasp the principle of nationalities, by which he has ground his potentates 
to powder. What is it that has made Austria so weak? It is because, by the very 
conditions of her existence, she is the enemy of the principles of nationality and 
autonomy. What has made Russia so weak? Her treatment of Poland. What has 
made her so strong? Because she is the vindicator of oppressed races. ["Oh! "] Is 
she not strong? Is she not the vindicator of oppressed races? You dislike the Slavs. 
I do not know why. I daresay you know as much about them as I do. The Slavs 
are a great nationality. You can not extinguish them. They have their rights and 
their sympathies, and whether you like them or not they will assert their existence. 
* * * England may appear at that conference in a character in which she would 
surpass the influence of Rusiia, for she might be the champion, not of one race, but of 
all the races there. I have heard a whisper of an Austrian alliance. Well, Sir, 
Austria has not had a fortunate history in modern Europe. And why? Because, 
from the conditions of her existence, she has been opposed to the principle of national- 
ities, and her Empire has broken away. Therefore it is that she has been obliged to 
have a dual Government and a dual policy. I should be glad that Her Majesty's 
Government should have the alliance of Austria for objects which England can desire 

47 



48 THE BEELIN CONGKESS. 

and approve — for the protection of Constantinople, for the preservation of the freedom 
of the navigation of the Straits and of the Danube; but if you are going to purchase 
that alliance by aiding her in paring down the autonomy of the Christian Provinces 
of Tiu'key— if that is what you desii-e, then I have a right to say that that is a policy 
not worthy of the English nation. I had hoped * * * that Her Majesty's 
Government would appear at the congress as the champion of those who have'no 
power to defend themselves — I mean the Greek nationality. But what is the policy 
on which you ask oui- confidence? This is far more important than all these party 
squabbles, })ecause this is the question on which the permanent peace of Europe 
depends, and upon which the future of England must rest. I hope, therefore, that 
before the end of this debate, we shall hear from Her Majesty's Government * * * 
what is the spiiit in which you are going to the conference. Are you going to endeavor 
to save out of the wreck some miserable fragment of a ruined system; or are you going, 
as you ought to go, to call a new world into existence, to repaii' the scandals of the old? 
Are you going to this conference in the spiiit of Castlereagh or in the spirit of Canning? 
That policy, which began by emancipating the Greeks, I hope you are not going to 
mar it, as the policy of Canning was marred by the Duke of Wellington and Lord 
Aberdeen. That is a question we have a right to ask before assenting to give you 
oin- confidence on the money which you say is requii'ed to strengthen you in the 
negotiations * * *. 



Appendix V. 



The following excerpt from The Times (July 9, 1878) indicates just 
how far the principle of nationality was considered in the Batoum 
question and generally in all questions before the Congress: 

The Agence Russe says: 

"At no stage of the deliberations, even when the question raised was that Russia 
should concede the Balkan range as the frontier of Turkey, have there been such 
numerous discussions, pourparlers, and interviews between the Russian and English 
plenipotentiaries as have been required for the settlement of the Batoum question 
* * *. Nevertheless, at the meeting of the Commission and the interviews held on 
Saturday, the question had already made progress toward solution. An agreement 
had been come to upon the stibject of making Batoum a free port and upon the words 
'an essentially commercial port,' but yesterday Lord Salisbury, at an interview with 
Prince Gortchakoff, brought forward the subject of the Lazes, a population numbering 
in all 40.000, of whom there are only 15,000 in the territory which Russia is to receive. 
Lord Salisbury asked that in the cession to be made to Russia the territory occupied 
by these Lazes should not be included in consequence of the declarations made by them 
in their recent address to the British Parliament that they would not submit to the 
Russian authorities. His lordship based his argument upon the principle of nationali- 
ties and plebiscites, which he said the Congress had up to the present made the bases 
of its deliberations. Prince Gortchakoff replied that the Congress, on the contrary, 
had in nowise respected this principle either as regards the Bulgarians or the Greeks. 
His Highness added that as the territory in question was adjacent to the town of Batoum 
itself, the arrangement proposed by Lord Salisbury would be a constant cause of con- 
flict, especially in view of the shameful trade in Circassian women and children for 
the harems of Constantinople. Prince Gortchakoff further argued that the address 
alluded to possessed no significance, as it was promoted by the British consuls. Lord 
Beaconsfield, it is said, subsequently stated with more precision the essence of the 
demands made by Lord Salisbury, and a compromise appears to have been the result." 
88264—18 4 49 



Appendix VI. 



Beaconsfield's threatened withdrawal from the Congress, as told 
by A. N. Gumming in The Nineteenth Century and After, July, 
1905, pages 83-90: 

On the morning after that decision [adjournment to await the Russian answer on 
Bulgaria] Lord Beaconsfield came into my room. He said: "I have been thinking 
v\ t this matter very seriously most of the night, and I have quite made up my mind 
what to do. It seems to me impossible for Russia to concede these points, and, if they 
refuse, I have sketched out my plan. We will return to England at once. My desire 
"-■s, if possible, to get to London upon Sunday night and to have a good night's rest. 
On Monday morning I shall go down to Osborne — or Windsor — and after lunch I 
propose to lay my report before Her Majesty. A declaration of war with Russia will 
follow. Kindly make the necessary arrangements for our journey." " I rang for a Brad- 
shaw, " said Lord Rowton, "and spent some time in studying it. I found, as a matter 
of fact, that it would be impossible for us to carry out Lord Beaconsfield's plan. The 
trains did not suit. We could only get to London on the Sunday night if we took a 
special train from Cologne. Accordingly, without any hesitation, I wrote out a tele- 
gram to the station master at Cologne — whom I happened to know — a colonel some- 
body — they are all old military officers in Germany — ordering him to have a special 
train ready for Lord Beaconsfield and myself at such and such an hour on the speci- 
fied day. 

"You may be surprised to hear it, but that telegram was the turning point of the 
whole affair. The next day or the day after I was walking along a few yards from 
our hotel when I met Prince Bismarck driving in an open carriage. He stopped it 
and asked me where Lord Beaconsfield was. I told him that he was in the hotel, 
and Prince Bismarck asked: 'Can I see him?' 'Yes,' I replied. Then he pulled 
Out his watch and said: 'Look here; at the present moment it is 12 minutes to 4, 
and I am due with my prince at the palace at 4 o'clock. I wish to see Lord Beacons- 
field, and I shall go up to him, but I wish you to come to us at 5 minutes to 4 sharp 
and announce to me the exact time.' We went along to the hotel, and I showed 
him up to Lord Beaconsfield's room. Punctually at 5 minutes to 4 I knocked on 
the door. WTien I went in, the two were talking about the horribly bad paving of' 
the Wilhelmstrasse. I begged their pardon and told Prince Bismarck that it was 
5 minutes to 4. He bowed and thanked me and I left the room. In two minutes 
the door opened. Prince Bismarck came out, got into his carriage, and drove away. 
He would reach the palace punctually at 4 o'clock. I went in to Lord Beaconsfield 
and apologized for having intruded. He said, 'Don't mention it, my dear Corry; 
you no doubt had a very good reason for what you did. But a very curious thing 
occurred. The moment after you left the room Bismarck turned sharply to me. 
We had been talking on indifferent subjects before, but now he said: 'Lord Beacons- 
field, do these four points really represent England's ultimatum to Russia?' And 
I said, 'Yes; they do.' 

"The Congress met again for a final decision on this matter at the appointed time. 
Whilst the meeting was going on I waited outside as usual. After a sitting of a couple 

51 



52 " THE BERLIN CONGRESS. 






of hours, the door opened, and I noticed particularly that the Russians came out first, 
Schouvaloff at their head. Lord Beaconsfield, as was his custom, came out last of 
all, and when he was going away he took my arm and said: 'My dear Corry, I have 
seen what I never expected to see. Russia has given way on all four points.' We 
subsequently discovered, of course, that my telegram to the station master at Cologne 
had been promptly transmitted to Prince Bismarck. He thereupon saw that Lord 
Beaconsfield was in earnest. He knew, and this we did not discover until a good 
deal later, that as a matter of fact the Russians had received orders from the Tsar 
practically to submit to anything rather than go to war with England. He knew 
that, but we did not. Both at the first interview of which I told yoii, and after that 
lucky telegram of mine to Cologne, he saw that Lord Beaconsfield was in earnest. 
He had taken the measure of the man, he told the Russians what the fact was, and 
the result was that they gave in. I may tell you further that the Russian pretext thai 
they must consult the Tsar upon the question of those four points was a mere blind. 
They did send off a messenger — one of their highest diplomats — but we learned later 
on that he left the train at Konigsberg and did not proceed any farther (pp. 87-88)." 

o 



"^6 



